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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
THE STATE OF UTAH, : 
Plaintiff/Appellee, : 
v. : 
SHERMAN ALEXANDER LYNCH, : Case No. 20090628-CA 
Defendant/Appellant. : 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
The Court of Appeals has jurisdiction pursuant to UtahlCode Ann. § 78A-4-
103(2)(j) (2008). The trial court entered judgment and conviction against Appellant 
Sherman Lynch for murder, a first degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-203 
(Supp. 2007); and obstruction of justice, a second degree felony under Utah Code Ann. § 
76-8-306 (Supp. 2007). The judgment is attached as Addendub A. R. 220-21. 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, PRESERVATION 
Issue I: Whether the lack of any instruction on the alibi defense constituted error. 
Standard of Review: This Court reviews jury instruction issues for correctness, 
giving no deference to the trial court. State v. Gallezos^ 2009 UT 42, H 10, - P.3d --. 
Preservation: The first issue was not preserved. Lynch fias raised it under the 
plain-error and manifest-injustice doctrines. See State v. Shurn\vay, 2002 UT 124, ^  7, 63 
P.3d 94 (discussing plain error on appeal); State v. Alinas. 200t UT 83 % 10, 171 P.3d 
1046 (stating in most circumstances, manifest injustice is synonymous with plain error). 
1 
Also, he has raised it under the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine. See State v. 
Chacon, 962 P.2d 48, 50 (Utah 1998) (evaluating ineffective assistance claims "as a 
matter of law"); State v. Perry. 2009 UT App 51, | 9, 204 P.3d 880. The jury 
instructions are attached as Addendum B. 
Issue II: Whether the prosecutor committed misconduct in closing argument when 
she represented to the jury that Lynch confessed to the homicide. 
Standard of Review: This Court will review an issue of prosecutorial misconduct 
for an abuse of discretion. See State v. Wemreen. 2007 UT App 264, If 10, 167 P.3d 516. 
Preservation: The second issue was not preserved. This Court will review unpre-
served claims for plain error. State v. Patrick. 2009 UT App 226, \ 12, 217 P.3d 1150. 
Also, Lynch has argued ineffective assistance of counsel. See, e.g.. State v. Ross, 2007 
UT 89, fflf 53-58, 174 P.3d 628; State v. Harris. No. 20020337-CA, 2003 UT App 384 
(unpublished). Excerpts from the prosecutor's argument are attached as Addendum C. 
RULES, STATUTES AND CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
The following provisions are relevant to the issues on appeal and set forth at 
Addendum D: U.S. Const, amend. VI (ensuring the right to counsel) and XIV (ensuring 
due process); and Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (ensuring due process). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Nature of the Case, Course of the Proceedings, Disposition in the Court Below 
On October 10, 2007, the State filed an information against Lynch for murder and 
obstructing justice. R. 1-3. On December 21, 2007, the trial court presided over a 
preliminary hearing and bound Lynch over for trial on the charges. See_ R. 67-68. In 
November 2008, the trial court began a three day jury trial, ft. 132; 137-38; 168-69; 173-
74. At the conclusion, the jury found Lynch guilty as charged. R. 196 (dated November 
14, 2008). On January 26, 2009, the court sentenced Lynch to consecutive prison terms. 
See R. 220-21 (sentencing fifteen years to life for count one, land one to fifteen years for 
count two). Lynch made a request for an extension of time t0 file a motion for a new 
trial, and on March 9, 2009, he filed the motion. R. 222-35. On May 1, 2009, the trial 
court held an evidentiary hearing. R. 262. And on June 30, ^009, the court denied the 
motion in a Memorandum Decision. R. 263-68. On July 28, ,2009, Lynch filed a notice 
of appeal. R. 270. The appeal is timely. Utah R. App. P. 3 ^ 4 (2009). 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Witnesses Found Pat Rothermich Injured on Haven Lafie. 
Ryan Collins testified that on October 3, 2007, he was Working on Haven Lane in 
Holladay, when he heard a crash, like a "large truck hitting a ^peed bump" at a fast pace. 
R. 283:26-27. He did not see anything. R. 283:27. It was 3:2|5 p.m. R. 283:28-29. 
At about the same time, Eileen Naylor was driving on Haven Lane when she saw a 
woman lying on the side of the road in the bushes. See R. 283|:31, 33; State's Exhibits 8, 
18. The woman was Pat Rothermich. Naylor called 911 and stayed at the scene until 
paramedics arrived. R. 283:34-35. It was approximately "3:2$ or something like that, 
3:20." R. 283:36. Angela Petersen drove behind Naylor and stopped as well. SeeR. 
283:39-40. Petersen could tell that Rothermich had been hit. R. 283:40. Petersen tried 
talking to Rothermich, but she was nonresponsive. R. 283:43. 
Paramedic David Kluger arrived at the scene with other I emergency personnel. R. 
283:54-55; State's Exhibits 6, 18; see also R. 283:64-67 (stating Roland Gilmore 
assisted). He "believe[d]" the dispatch time was 3:18 p.m. R. 283:55. Kluger worked to 
secure Rothermich's airway and spine and felt for a pulse. R. 283:56-58. Kluger 
testified that Rothermich's condition was "severely compromised"; she was "barely 
sustaining life" with head trauma, a left calf injury, and severe shock. R. 283:59. After 
beginning emergency measures, Kluger placed Rothermich in an ambulance. R. 283:60. 
During the transport, Rothermich went into full cardiac arrest and stopped breathing. R. 
283:61. She was pronounced dead at the hospital. R. 283:67. 
Investigating Officers Determined a Truck Was Involved. 
Deputy Michael Anderson initially took charge of the collision scene. See R. 
283:72-73. Although his investigation normally began with witnesses, R. 283:73, "[n]o 
eyewitnesses were ever identified." R. 284:10. He marked and diagramed the scene and 
took photographs. R. 283:74-79; State's Exhibits 7-9. He located pieces from 
Rothermich's sunglasses. R. 283:79-81; State's Exhibits 9, 12-14. And he collected 
three zip ties in the roadway "in line with the collision path." R. 283:81-84; State's 
Exhibits 18, 19; see also R. 285:105; State's Exhibit 77. He stated the zip ties had "white 
paint" in the locking mechanism, and he opined they "may have come off [the] vehicle" 
involved in the collision. R. 283:82-83. The zip ties had a shape or form to them, and 
they were broken at the locking mechanism. R. 283:84-86; State's Exhibits 20, 77. 
Anderson stated that a vehicle struck Rothermich and made injuries that left a trail 
or path of tissue along the road. R. 283:86-88; State's Exhibits 15, 16. Anderson detected 
"clothing transfer on the pavement." R. 283:89. Also, he observed "white paint transfer 
in the material" on several areas of Rothermich's pants. R. 2$3:93-97; State's Exhibit 
47-50. The investigation led Anderson to believe they were lboking for a white vehicle 
with a "high front end. . . , such as a truck or a van." R. 283:^7; see also R. 284:18. 
According to Anderson, the collision would have occurred in |the westbound driving lane 
while Rothermich was walking on the shoulder in a direction ^'opposing traffic. The 
collision happened from basically directly behind her." R. 283:98. Upon impact, she 
would have been projected forward "off the front of the vehicle" forcing her to slide a 
distance of "some 43 feet." R. 283:99. Anderson estimated tl^ e speed for the vehicle at 
the time of impact may have been between 24 and 29 miles aq hour, or "a little higher." 
R. 283:109-10. He stated there were no problems with road conditions. R. 283:100. 
Anderson went to Rothermich's home on Indian Rock Road and made contact 
with Rothermich's husband, Lynch. R. 283:102. Anderson inspected Lynch's van, R. 
283:101, and found no evidence to suggest it was involved. RJ. 283:101. 
During the investigation, Anderson received a report off "a red truck in the area" of 
the collision at around 3:25, and separate reports of a landscaple truck in the area. R. 
284:10-11, 13,16 (stating Vicky Smooty or Smoothie made a (report); 285:114 (same); 
284:16-17 (stating a person reported seeing two Hispanic mal^s); 285:114-15 (same); 
284:24 (stating all reports were for a truck in the area between|3:20 and 3:25); 285:115 
(agreeing that Brian Maxwell filled out a report of a red truck)|. 
On October 4, Anderson attended the autopsy for Rothermich. R. 283:104. He 
noted measurements as presented by the medical examiner. R| 283:104-05. Anderson 
noted an injury on the left mid calf at 13.7 inches; an injury on the right mid calf at 11.4 
inches; an injury on the inner thigh and left buttocks at 29.9 inches; injuries in the center 
of the back at 35.8 inches and 36.2 inches; and an injury in the center of the back at 49.2 
inches. R. 283:106; State's Exhibit 76. Anderson intended to use the measurements to 
line up impact points with the suspect vehicle. R. 283:105. 
Lynch Was at Costco on the Afternoon of October 3. 
Deputy Schroeder testified that he responded to the Haven Lane collision, and 
from there went to the Rothermich/Lynch home on Indian Rock Road. R. 284:29-31 
(stating it was about 4:00 on October 3). He knocked on the door and no one answered. 
R. 284:32. He checked with neighbors then went back to the Rothermich/Lynch re-
sidence and went inside through an unlocked door. R. 284:32-33. While Schroeder was 
there, Lynch walked in. R. 284:33. He was carrying a container of milk. R. 284:40. 
Lynch asked "what's going on?" R. 284:34. According to Schroeder, Lynch was "ner-
vous, a little distraught, kind of shaky, not sure of what to do." R. 284:34. Schroeder 
told Lynch of the accident but did not give details. R. 284:35. Lynch told Schroeder that 
his knees were weak. R. 284:35. Also, he told Schroeder he saw Rothermich at 3:00 
p.m. R. 284:36. They set out for a walk, and Lynch went back to the house early to use 
the bathroom, and at that point he decided to go to Costco for milk. R. 284:36, 38. 
Another officer, Deputy Morley, identified Lynch's receipts from Costco. R. 
284:109; State's Exhibit 86. The first receipt was for gasoline and was dated "10-3 of 
'07" at "1544 hours," and the second receipt was for milk the same day at "1555 hours." 
R. 284:110. The Costco was near 5300 South and State Street. R. 284:111. Morley did 
not check the flow rate for pumping gas at Costco. R. 284:112-13. He acknowledged 
that Lynch purchased 15.35 gallons of gas before 3:44 p.m. R. 284:110. 
Detective Chad Reyes testified that he met Lynch at the hospital. R. 284:45. 
Lynch was distraught and "having an extremely difficult time processing the tragedy." 
R. 284:46, 60 (agreeing that Reyes made notes in his report)., Reyes interviewed Lynch 
in the grieving room. R. 284:61. He asked Lynch about eveiits that afternoon, and Reyes 
considered there to be discrepancies in Lynch's statements. $pecifically, Lynch told 
Reyes that after he returned to the house early from the walk with Rothermich, he 
decided to go to Costco and did not contact Rothermich befofle leaving. R. 284:48. Also, 
Lynch reported that "his wife didn't want anything" from the istore. R. 284:48. Reyes 
pointed out the discrepancies and Lynch claimed to be "mistaken when he gave [] his 
first version, that he did actually seek out his wife to see if sh$ needed anything from the 
store" and she told him "she didn't." R. 284:48. Lynch also told Reyes that Rothermich 
varied her walking route so it took some time before "he ultimately found her at the 
intersection of Cottonwood [L]ane and Haven Lane near a hoflse pasture." R. 284:48-49. 
It was approximately 3:30 p.m. R. 284:50; see also R. 284:19-20, 22 (stating Anderson 
investigated Lynch's alibi and reviewed a video of Lynch at Costco). 
The State Presented No Evidence to Support that Lynch Stood to Gain Financially 
from Rothermich fs Death. Indeed, Lynch Was Grief Stricken. 
Don Carter testified that he and Pat Rothermich had befcn neighbors for 32 years. 
R. 284:65. On October 3, he received a call from St. Mark's (Hospital, and he met Lynch 
there. R. 284:66-67. When he entered the hospital doors, Ly)ach wrapped his arms 
around Carter and sobbed, "Oh, Don, Don, I don't know what|I'm going to do. Pat's 
dead." R. 284:67. Carter also claimed that Lynch stated, "'What have I,' then 
immediately corrected and said, 'What am I going to do?5" R. 284:67, 78. 
Carter returned home with Lynch that afternoon, R. 284:69, and decided Lynch 
should not be left alone. R. 284:71. Carter, his wife, and another friend, Kathleen 
Mathie, ate Chinese food with Lynch, and when they finished, Lynch grabbed a fortune 
cookie and broke it. R. 284:71, 75. "[I]t said something about he was going to be 
coming into some money." R. 284:76. Lynch then stated something about Rothermich's 
"retirement, that he gets her retirement or something, and I don't know, maybe something 
about [] insurance, but I'm not sure." R. 284:76. 
Kathleen Mathie testified that she also met Lynch at the hospital on October 3. R. 
284:93. She described Lynch as "extremely emotional" and sobbing. R. 284:94. He 
said something about "not being able to get along without [Pat] and what was he going to 
do and those types of things." R. 284:94. Mathie went to Lynch's house for Chinese 
food. R. 284:98. She testified that when Lynch opened his fortune cookie, it "was kind 
of bizarre." R. 284:98. Lynch's cookie said "he was going to come into a lot of money, 
and he found that quite amusing." R. 284:98. Mathie considered the matter to be "kind 
of inappropriate." R. 284:98. 
Carter took Lynch to his home for the night. R. 284:72. At 3:30 or 4:00 in the 
morning, Carter noticed that Lynch and his van were gone. R. 284:73. He called the 
sheriff. R. 284:73-74. Lynch returned by 7:30 a.m. R. 284:74. Deputy Alan Morley 
met with Lynch at his home at 8:00. R. 284:107. Lynch was calm and collected. R. 
284:107. He mentioned the fortune cookie to Morley. He told Morley that his fortune 
said "I'm about to come into a large inheritance." R. 284:109. Notably, the State 
presented no evidence to support that Lynch would inherit an)y funds or property as a 
result of Rothermich's death. 
Nancy Scott Assisted Officers in the Investigation. Sh§ Was Angry at Lynch, 
Nancy Scott testified that she met Lynch in July 2007 and they dated. R. 284:116. 
Lynch told her he rented a house in Holladay. In September, i she drove by the house and 
saw him "walking up the street with a lady." R. 284:118-20,1143-44. Scott called Lynch 
on his cell phone. He "didn't answer. And then within a few (minutes" he called her back. 
R. 284:120, 144. She asked who he was with, and "he said itlwas his landlord, Pat." R. 
284:120. Lynch told Scott he rented the basement. R. 284:1^0. Scott asked why Lynch 
had not disclosed his living arrangements. R. 284:120. Scottlwas upset and felt betrayed. 
R. 284:121. Lynch told Scott he met Pat "dancing and they hfrd become friends." R. 
284:122. Pat offered to have Lynch live in her home to share)expenses. R. 284:122. 
Lynch assured Scott there was nothing else he was keeping from her. R. 284:122. 
On October 3, Lynch and Scott planned to have dinner] together. R. 284:123. 
Scott called him at 7:15 to say she was on her way home and ]Lynch said "okay." R. 
284:124. Half an hour later, Lynch called to say "he would not be coming over because 
his landlord Pat had just been killed in a hit and run accident.'^ R. 284:124. "[H]e 
seemed a bit anxious and a little upset, but basically he was just going to be helping take 
care of things." R. 284:125. 
On October 4, 2007, Scott and Lynch talked again by p^hone. R. 284:126. Lynch 
told Scott "he had been busy with interviews." R. 284:126. Scott later watched a news 
program and saw that Lynch was identified as Pat Rothermich's husband. R. 284:127. 
She was confused and devastated. R. 284:127-28. When she got off work, she called 
him and asked, "[W]hat's going on?" "Are you married to her?" R. 284:128. Lynch 
denied that he was married and explained that friends "thought it would be better" if he 
said in interviews that they were married given their living arrangements. R. 284:128. 
When Scott learned that authorities were looking for a white truck, she contacted 
police. See R. 284:129, 135-36, 207. She told them Lynch had purchased a white truck 
at a car auction several weeks earlier. R. 284:130. The truck was a white 1993 Chevy 
pickup. Scott stated that in August 2007, she drove Lynch to an auction house, where he 
picked up the truck, and she followed him to the backyard of a house with a big garage in 
the Cottonwood area. R. 284:131-33. 
On October 5, Scott took Detective Brent Adamson to the garage where Lynch 
had stored the truck and to the auto auction in Murray. R. 284:136-37, 209-210; 285:112. 
Adamson obtained information on the truck, and contacted Alan Ostler, the owner of the 
garage where the truck had been stored. R. 284:212. Ostler confirmed that he had rented 
the garage to Lynch and he told officers that he saw newsprint with white overspray on 
the truck windows. R. 284:213-14. Also, Ostler had requested that Lynch move the 
white Chevy out of the garage in September 2007, and as Lynch drove away, Ostler saw 
"the hood of the truck blow open". R. 284:214. 
Officers Focused Their Investigation on Lynch. 
After Detective Adamson and Deputy Anderson learned that Lynch had purchased 
a white Chevy truck, Anderson met with the manager of the auto auction and obtained 
receipts and a vehicle identification number. R. 283:112-13. Also, he went with 
Adamson to Ostler's garage at 2888 East County Road (R. 2$4:210-11), and recovered 
paint, carpet and metal shavings or flakes. R. 283:114-15. Ilk addition, officers observed 
white paint on Ostler's garage floor. R. 284:218. 
Within a few days of the incident, on October 8, Adanlison and Anderson located 
the 1993 white Chevy truck in a previously boarded-up garage at 5972 South Holladay 
Boulevard. R. 283:115-21; 284:220-22 (stating officers confirmed the vehicle 
identification number); State's Exhibits 21, 22, 23, 24, 25. Anderson examined the truck 
and stated it had "the type of evidence on the front of it that y0u would expect to see in a 
collision with a pedestrian." R. 283:119, 124-27; State's Exhibits 28, 29, 31. It was "old, 
beat[] up," "dirty" and in "poor condition." R. 283:121. It Md muddy footprints on it. 
R. 283:122-23; State's Exhibits 26, 27. "[T]he hood itself didn't appear to be latched 
down correctly. It appeared to be loose." R. 283:131, 137; State's Exhibit 36. 
Anderson took measurements of the vehicle. R. 283:1^2-36; State's Exhibit 37, 
38, 39, 40, 41. He stated there were "some similarities" in th0 measurements from the 
truck when compared to injuries noted on Rothermich. R. 283:136. Anderson examined 
the engine compartment and noted "alterations to the front portion under the hood of the 
vehicle." R. 283:137; State's Exhibit 42. He saw peeled or ptied metal. R. 283:137; 
State's Exhibit 42. The pry marks were "fairly fresh." R. 2831:138. And he found "a 
portion of a zip tie" in an area left of the radiator. R. 283:139-+42; State's Exhibits 44, 45, 
78; see also R. 285:105; State's Exhibit 78. Also, he identified a "tow hook on the front 
of the vehicle." R. 283:131, 134-36. 
Adamson collected swabs and a plastic wrap for a tarp in the truck bed, R. 
284:223, and he recovered a sticker dated August 25, 2007, from an auto auction with 
Lynch's name and bidder number. R. 285:71-72; State's Exhibit 35. Also, Adamson 
talked to Joseph Taylor, the previous owner of the Chevy truck. R. 285:75; State's 
Exhibit 97. Taylor purchased the truck in 1993. R. 285:76. He used it for a landscaping 
and a lawn care business. R. 285:76. He had advertisements and stickers on the sides of 
the truck. R. 285:76. He never used zip ties on it. R. 285:77. 
Taylor traded the truck to a car dealership in June 2007. R. 285:76. At that time, 
the truck was damaged as follows: It had "[r]ust spots on the roof and dimming paint on 
the sides, [a] broken passenger side mirror, [a] dent on the front passenger side, [a] dent 
on the driver's side on the rear of the pickup, [and the] interior was in extremely poor 
condition and the hood latch was not working properly." R. 285:76. 
Taylor met with Adamson and identified the 1993 Chevy truck at the Holladay 
Boulevard address. R. 285:77. Taylor observed new damage as follows: "[A m]issing 
antenna, crack in the windshield just underneath the windshield wipers, white paint in 
several locations, two holes in the sheet metal under the hood along the front of the en-
gine compartment, and all of the damage to the hood including the dent on the surface of 
the hood and the front of the hood." R. 285:77. Also, Taylor stated since he traded in the 
truck in June 2007, it had an additional 18 miles on the odometer. R. 285:77. 
Adamson collected evidence from Lynch's home and van. R. 284:226-33; 285: 
118 (stating officers recovered a blue tarp and pants at the property, they saw mud on the 
van, and they recovered property from the van); 285:59-70 (stating he collected several 
items from the van including orange stake(s); receipts dated October 7 and October 8, 
2007, for hardware and tools; a green tarp; a towing device oif hitch and a hidden hitch; 
unused nuts and bolts; five cans of white Rustoleum aerosol ^pray paint; and a vehicle in-
transit permit for the 1993 Chevy pickup truck); 285:102 (ideptifying papers relating to 
the Chevy pickup); State's Exhibits 56, 57, 62, 63, 64, 65, 66^  67, 80, 82, 83, 84, 85, 87, 
100, 101. And officers located an orange stake in a field north of the garage on Holladay 
Boulevard. R. 284:224; 285:104; State's Exhibit 88. 
Adamson clocked the mileage from the auto auction toi Ostler's garage; and from 
"Haven Lane where the crash occurred" to the boarded-up gaifage on Holladay 
Boulevard. R. 285:78-79. The total mileage for the drive w^s less than 18 miles. R. 
285:79. Also, Adamson tested the truck and stated it was operational and "handled 
safely". R. 285:80-81. He stated the speedometer was synchronized, reaching up to a 
maximum speed of 45 miles per hour. R. 285:81. 
With respect to timing, Adamson stated that Unified F^re received the initial 
emergency call on October 3 at 3:18, and Lynch provided receipts from Costco for 3:44 
and 3:55 for that same afternoon. R. 285:83. According to Adamson, he was able to 
drive from Haven Lane, to the garage at Holladay Boulevard where the truck was stored, 
to Costco near 5300 South and State Street, in about 14 minutbs. R. 285:83. Based on 
that assessment, Adamson believed he could easily get from tjlaven Lane to the boarded-
up garage to Costco in 26 minutes. R. 285:84, 102-04. 
Several days after the incident, Adamson recorded an interview with Lynch. R. 
285:106-09 (stating the interview was on October 8); State's $xhibit 94. The prosecution 
played portions of the recording to the jury. R. 285:108. Adamson confirmed that in the 
interview, Lynch reported that before the incident, he drove the truck to 4500 South 
where he gave it to a person named Chuck. R. 285:109; see also State's Exhibit 94. 
After the interview, Adamson clocked the mileage from the auto auction to the 
Ostler garage, then to 1-15 and 4500 South, and back to the garage on Holladay 
Boulevard where officers found the truck. R. 285:109-10. The mileage for those routes 
"exceeded the 18 miles that have been logged since the car was sold by Mr. Taylor." R. 
285:110. Moreover, Adamson never found evidence of Chuck. R. 285:110. 
Forensics Witnesses Tested Materials but Did Not Get Specific Results. 
Jennifer McNair provided expert testimony on paint analysis. R. 284:170-75. 
She testified that vehicles have a multi-layered paint system, including a primer layer, a 
color layer or base coat, and a clear coat. R. 284:180. McNair examined Rothermich's 
pants. R. 284:183; State's Exhibits 51, 52. She observed "white smears," small particles 
of paint, and paint fragments on the back of the pants. R. 284:184-85, 188-89; State's 
Exhibits 53, 54, 68, 69. The samples revealed an off-white substance with an adhering 
particulate, and multi-layered paint fragments. R. 284:190-91. 
McNair collected samples from the 1993 Chevy truck. R. 284:191-92. She 
inspected the grill from the truck and a piece of the hood. R. 284:192-93. She examined 
the truck to "see if there were different types of paint present." R. 284:193. She con-
sidered samples taken from the back of the truck, and from the passenger's and driver's 
side. R. 284:194. Also, she removed a sample from the passenger door. R. 284:194. 
McNair observed that some parts of the truck had what appeared to be an automotive 
finish, and she observed paint with a glossy finish and a dull|finish on the truck. R. 
284:195. McNair received five cans of spray paint for analysis. R. 284:195. All five 
cans were unused. R. 284:196. Two were labeled, "Rustoleum clean metal primer," and 
three were labeled, "Rustoleum flat protective enamel." R. 284:196. They all contained 
white paint. R. 284:196. McNair performed analysis on all items. R. 284:196. 
McNair stated the two smears on Rothermich's pants did not come from the hood 
of the truck or the sample from the passenger door. R. 284:197-98. However, they were 
the "same distinct type of paint as that on the passenger's sidd truck bed" and the "same 
distinct type of paint as the white paint in the unused aerosol (fan labeled Rustoleum flat 
protective enamel." R. 284:199. McNair opined that "the whfte smears 1 and 2 on the 
pants originated either from the passenger's side truck bed or from another source of 
paint having the same characteristics." R. 284:199, 201. 
Also, McNair considered fragments from the pants to b0 similar to paint from the 
hood of the truck, "driver's side portion close to the front of the vehicle." R. 284:200. 
McNair stated that paint analysis does not allow for an 0xact source match. R. 
284:181,202. "[P]aint is manufactured in bulk." R. 284:181. The same paint may be 
seen on multiple vehicles. R. 284:181. The same is true for architectural paint or spray 
paint. R. 284:181. Nevertheless, McNair testified that paint at] car factories is always 
changing. "[Sjome white vehicles have metallic flakes in then)L," and some "might be a 
little bit more cream. So you have that variation in color and shine." R. 284:202. Also, 
it is unusual for a truck to have "spray paint or nonautomotive paint on it." R. 284:203. 
Todd Rigley provided expert testimony on DNA analysis. R. 285:15. He received 
zip ties, orange stakes, swabs and samples from the Chevy truck, and a hair strand or 
fiber from the hood of the truck. R. 285:19-23. He tested the items for a possible DNA 
match to Rothermich, Lynch or Scott. R. 285:20-24. The samples were insufficient and 
failed to support a match. R. 285:20-24. Rigley testified that given the "severe damage 
to the victim's leg" during the collision, he thought "there would be a lot of blood or 
tissue" on the suspect truck, but he found nothing on the 1993 Chevy pickup. R. 285:27. 
David Wakefield provided expert testimony on physical markings or patterns. R. 
285:30-31. He assessed whether pieces of zip ties found at the collision scene could 
match the zip tie found in the engine of the white pickup truck. Se£ R. 285:32-42; State's 
Exhibits 70, 71, 72, 73, 74, 75, 77, 78. He identified patterns between the pieces and 
discernable fracture lines to conclude that the pieces from the collision site matched the 
zip tie in the truck. R. 285:37-42. Significantly, Wakefield did not observe paint on the 
zip tie pieces in his analysis. R. 285:45. But see R. 284:11; 285:106, 122 (referencing 
paint on the zip ties). In addition, he could not say whether he examined the pieces 
before or after they were submitted for DNA testing or scraped for paint analysis, R. 285: 
45-46, although it did not appear to him that the items had been altered. R. 285:47. But 
see R. 285:106 (stating Wakefield examined the zip ties after McNair processed them). 
Additional Witnesses Testified. 
The State presented evidence from other witnesses as follows. 
Julio Estrada was familiar with the boarded-up garage at Holladay Boulevard 
where officers located the 1993 Chevy truck. R. 283:144-46; State's Exhibit 21. In 
October 2007, he used the garage for storage. R. 283:145. At some point, Estrada and 
his wife discovered the truck in the garage, and they found the boards propped up against 
the property. R. 283:147-49. Estrada called police. R. 283:1147-49. 
Rothermich 5s daughter, Jennifer Fabsik, made funera^ arrangements for her 
mother and wrote the obituary. R. 284:147-48. Fabsik's version of the obituary stated 
that Rothermich was survived by "her husband, Sherman Lyi^ch." R. 284:149. That 
version did not appear in the newspaper. R. 284:149-50; Stage's Exhibit 91. Fabsik did 
not know who changed the obituary. R. 284:149. 
Steve Richards testified that he lived in the area of Holladay Boulevard. R. 284: 
151. He described a paved lane ending in gravel at the end off the road. R. 284:153-54. 
In late September 2007, Richards saw a truck with a tarp drav^n tightly around it. R. 
284:152-56. After the collision involving Rothermich, Richards saw the truck in a garage 
that had been boarded up. R. 284:157-58, 159-60. "[T]he tn^ck was in the garage, and 
the boards were just kind of staggered, and they were leaning Up against the garage." R. 
284:158. Richards's father testified to similar facts. R. 284:1^1-66. 
Julie Douglas testified that she was a friend of Pat Rothermich. R. 285:55. After 
Rothermich's death, Douglas offered to help the kids clean out) the house. R. 285:55. 
Lynch's son, Kyle, was there. R. 285:50, 56. He wanted to us0 Lynch's van. R. 285:52. 
Kyle located a spare key for the van "behind the back license $late." R. 285:52. He had 
to bend the license plate a bit and then reach into the space behind it for the key. R. 
285:53. He found the key and pieces of paper. R. 285:53, 56; State's Exhibits 80, 81, 82. 
The papers included the title for the 1993 Chevy pickup truck ^nd a document from the 
American Auto Auction. R. 285:56-57. 
The parties stipulated to evidence. See R. 284:26-27, 103-04, 213-14; 285:48-49, 
76-77. A stipulation from Edward Leis stated that Pat Rothermich's manner of death was 
"non-accidental" and a result of "blunt force injuries to the head and torso due to motor 
vehicle versus pedestrian." R. 284:27. Rothermich suffered several injuries when she 
made impact with an object or the ground. R. 284:27. A stipulation from Dan Rascone 
stated he interviewed Lynch for a news program on October 4, 2007. R. 284:103-04. A 
stipulation from Alan Ostler concerned the garage Lynch rented in 2007 and the Chevy 
truck. R. 284:213-14. And a stipulation from Kay Gunnel stated that in September and 
October 2007, the Gunnels owned boarded-up property on Holladay Boulevard, "adjacent 
to their residence," and at the end "of a small road leading off of Holladay Boulevard." 
R. 285:48. The Gunnels rented the property to Julio Estrada for storage. R. 285:49. The 
Gunnels did not give permission to Lynch to park a truck at the property. R. 285:49. 
At the end of trial, the jury convicted. Lynch has raised trial issues on appeal. 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Witnesses presented evidence of an alibi defense at trial. Alibi was Lynch's sole 
defense. The trial court's jury instructions made no mention of the defense or of the 
State's burden in the context of an affirmative defense; they were deficient. This Court 
may address the issue under the plain-error or manifest-injustice doctrine, or under the 
ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis. Lynch respectfully requests that this Court 
reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial with proper instructions. 
Next, the prosecutor engaged in misconduct in this case when she represented to 
the jury in closing arguments that Lynch confessed to the homicide. Lynch did not 
confess. The prosecutor's statements called to the attention bf jurors matters which they 
were not allowed to consider in determining the verdict. Moreover, the jury likely was 
influenced by the remarks. The remarks were prejudicial. Tjiis Court may address the 
second issue under the plain-error or ineffective-assistance-of-counsel doctrine. Lynch 
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the convictions and remand the case for a new trial. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE JURY INSTRUCTIONS WERE DEFICIENT IN THAT THEY 
FAILED TO ADDRESS LYNCH'S ALIBI DEFEI 
T  
A. UTAH LAW PLAINLY SUPPORTS GIVING INSTRUCTIONS TO THE 
JURY IN CONNECTION WITH AN ALIBI DEFENCE. YET NO 
INSTRUCTIONS WERE GIVEN HERE. 
Under Utah law, and as a matter of fundamental fairne$s, a defendant has the right 
to have his "theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear ^nd understandable way." 
State v. Potter, 627 P.2d 75, 78 (Utah 1981); State v. Ontiver^s. 835 P.2d 201, 205 (Utah 
Ct. App. 1992) (stating the defendant has a right to have his theory presented "in a clear 
and comprehensible manner"); State v. Aly. 782 P.2d 549, 550 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) 
(stating u[a] criminal defendant is entitled to have the gist of hlis defense reflected in the 
instructions given to the jury, and the instructions should not incorrectly or misleadingly 
state the material rules of law"); Jorzensen v. Issa, 739 P.2d 80, 82 (Utah Ct. App. 1987) 
(stating "[a] party is clearly entitled to have the jury instructedl on his theory of the case"). 
"The purpose of the instructions is to set forth the issues and the law applicable thereto in 
a clear, concise and orderly manner, so that the jury will understand how to discharge its 
responsibilities." State v. Torres, 619 P.2d 694, 696 (Utah 198(0). A fair and impartial 
trial may only be had if the jury has been properly instructed as to the law of the case. 
Utah Const, art. I, § 7 (ensuring due process); U.S. Const, amend. XIV, § 1 (same). 
A corollary to the above principles is that the trial court has a duty to instruct the 
jury on the law applicable to the case. See State v. Low, 2008 UT 58, ^ 27, 192 P.3d 867; 
Potter, 627 P.2d at 78 (recognizing the trial court's duty). 
In addition, "a defendant is entitled to a jury instruction regarding an affirmative 
defense whenever there is evidence providing a factual basis for the defense." Low, 2008 
UT 58, % 29; State v. Knoll 111 P.2d 211,214 (Utah 1985) ("[Wjhen there is a basis in 
the evidence, whether the evidence is produced by the prosecution or by the defendant, 
which would provide some reasonable basis for the jury to conclude that a killing was 
done to protect the defendant from an imminent threat of death by another, an instruction 
on self-defense should be given the jury"); Torres, 619 P.2d at 695 (stating each party is 
"entitled to have the jury instructed on the law applicable to its theory of the case if there 
is any reasonable basis in the evidence to justify it"); State v. Castillo, 457 P.2d 618, 620 
(Utah 1969) (stating a defendant is entitled to have the jury instructed "fully and clearly" 
on his defense); State v. Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, fflf 8-9, 18 P.3d 1123 (recognizing that 
even where evidence is in conflict, the defendant is entitled to self-defense instructions). 
Evidence for an affirmative defense is sufficient if it raises the issue "to a 
conscious level in the minds of jurors." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^ f 8. Also, the evidence 
may be "'produced by the prosecution or by the defendant.5" Id, (citation omitted); see 
State v. Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^ 19 & n.l, 152 P.3d 315 (recognizing in a case for an 
affirmative defense or a lesser-included offense, a defendant "'may simply point to 
ambiguities or inconsistencies in the evidence presented by the State5") (citation omitted). 
Where evidence for a defense exists, "[t]rial courts should separately instruct each 
jury clearly that the State must disprove . . . affirmative defeases[] beyond a reasonable 
doubt." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 16 (emphasis added) (stating the burden of proof for 
affirmative defenses is "counter-intuitive," producing "the ne|ed for special jury 
instructions"). Trial courts should make plain that "'the defendant had no particular 
burden of proof [with respect to the affirmative defense] but [is] entitled to an acquittal if 
there [is] any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant was guilty of the offense.'" KnolL 111 P.2^ 1 at 214 (citation omitted; 
emphasis in Knoll). "It follows that a defendant is not require(d to establish [an 
affirmative defense] beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the 
evidence." M, And "the jury may acquit even though the [affirmative defense] fell 'far 
short of establishing the justification or excuse by a preponderance of the evidence upon 
the subject.5" IdL (citation omitted) see also Garcia, 2001 UT| App 19, f 11 (recognizing 
the defendant does not bear any burden where a defense is at ijssue). 
"The defense of alibi has always been considered a legitimate and proper defense. 
It frequently happens that it is the only defense an accused ha^." State v. Waidn 67 P.2d 
647, 651 (Utah 1937); see also Utah Code Ann. § 77-14-2 (20^8) (identifying "alibi" in 
the chapter entitled criminal "defenses55). 
An alibi defense challenges the State's ability to prove that the defendant 
committed the crime. Where there is evidence of alibi, the St4te must disprove the 
defense beyond a reasonable doubt. See KnolL 712 P.2d at 21)4-15 (stating the 
prosecution has the same burden of proof with respect to affirmative defenses including 
"lack of mental capacity and alibi") (emphasis added); see also State v. Fulton, 742 P.2d 
1208, 1213 (Utah 1987) (stating "an alibi defense challenges the State's ability to prove 
the statutory elements"); State v. Wilson. 565 P.2d 66, 67-68 (Utah 1977) (stating the 
alibi defense "stands on the same footing as other so-called defenses in criminal cases 
such as, e.g., entrapment, self-defense, lack of mental capacity, or [lack] of criminal 
intent"); State v. Whitely, 110 P.2d 337, 339-40 (Utah 1941) (recognizing the alibi 
defense in a case where the facts are uncertain or in contradiction, and ruling the State 
has the burden of proof); State v. Martinez. 2000 UT App 320, If 9, 14 P.3d 114 (stating 
"'[i]t is fundamental that the State carries the burden of proving beyond a reasonable 
doubt each element of an offense, including the absence of an affirmative defense once 
the defense is put into issue'") (citations omitted), aff'd, 2002 UT 80, 52 P.3d 1276; Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-1-502(2) (2008) (requiring the State to negate a defense "[b]y proof 
where there is evidence of the defense). 
In State v. Saunders, 82 Utah 170, 22 P.2d 1043 (1933), the Utah Supreme Court 
specifically articulated a form of an instruction that should be given to the jury when evi-
dence is presented for an alibi defense. The defendant there was charged with indecent 
assault on an eleven-year-old girl. See id. at 1043. The information alleged the offense 
occurred on October 13, 1931, and the State presented evidence "that the offense was 
committed" as it was getting dark before 8:00 p.m. "on either the 12th or 13th of October, 
1931." IcL at 1044. The defendant maintained he was at his boarding house all night on 
October 13. JjL Also, he claimed that on October 12, he was occupied with "readings on 
psychology" at various locations, including at the home of the girl's grandmother, Mrs. 
R. I(L Mrs. R. disputed that the defendant gave readings that|night. hL Moreover, the 
State argued that even if the evidence for October 12 supported the defendant's activities, 
the evidence did not disclose "[t]he length of time occupied by the readings or their exact 
nature or character," and the scene of the assault was not so far as to make it impossible 
for the defendant to give readings and to commit the crime. 7^ at 1044-45. 
Although the State's evidence disputed the alibi, the defendant requested that the 
trial court instruct the jury on his defense as follows: 
Evidence has been introduced tending to prove that defendant was not present at 
the scene of the offense at the time it is claimed to have been committed. If such 
evidence when considered in connection with all the other evidence in the case, 
creates in your mind a reasonable doubt as to defendants presence at the time and 
place the offense is alleged to have been committed, you should acquit him even 
though in the absence of such evidence you may believp him guilty beyond a 
reasonable doubt. 
Id. at 1044. The trial court rejected the instruction, "and no in$truction whatever was 
given to the jury upon the defendant's theory of alibi." IcL at 1045. After conviction, the 
defendant appealed. He claimed the trial court erred in failing | to instruct the jury on 
alibi. IdL at 1044. The Utah Supreme Court agreed. Jtf. at 1045-46. 
In deciding the matter, it did not consider the weight or (credibility of the alibi 
defense but determined that for purposes of an instruction, the (evidence was sufficient. 
See id. (stating the record contained evidence of alibi); see alstf Spillers, 2007 UT 13, ^[ 
10-12 & n.l (recognizing an appellate court will consider the qvidence in the light most 
favorable to the defense; and stating a defendant is entitled to $n instruction if there is a 
reasonable basis in the evidence). In addition, the court stated iwhere there is evidence of 
an alibi, the defendant is entitled to an instruction on that defense "especially when a 
request is made for such an instruction." Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1045. "'[EJvidence 
offered to prove an alibi is not to be disregarded."5 IcL (citation omitted). Moreover, the 
jury should be instructed as follows: "if the evidence of alibi, when considered in 
connection with all the other evidence in the case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the guilt 
of the defendant, then he should be acquitted." IcL at 1046; see also State v. Hanna, 81 
Utah 583, 21 P.2d 537, 539 (1933) (stating defendant was entitled "to an instruction that 
if [evidence of alibi], considered in connection with the other evidence in the case, raised 
a reasonable doubt as to his guilt, he was entitled to an acquittal"). 
In this case, Lynch was investigated for and charged with the death of Pat 
Rothermich. SeeR. 1-3. Yet he maintained he could not have been involved because he 
had an alibi: he was at Costco on the afternoon of October 3. See R. 284:18-20, 36, 38 
(reflecting that Lynch explained to Schroeder that he was at Costco). Lynch produced 
two receipts from the Costco near 5300 South and State Street showing that he was at the 
store on October 3, before 3:44 p.m. R. 284:22, 109-13; State's Exhibit 86. Also, several 
State witnesses testified to the alibi. Deputy Anderson reviewed a video of Lynch at the 
Costco. R. 284:19-20. Lynch explained to Deputy Schroeder that he had gone to Costco. 
R. 284:36, 38. He explained his whereabouts to Detective Reyes. R. 284:47-50. And 
Deputy Morley obtained the Costco receipts. R. 284:109-113; see also R. 284:96. 
The evidence was sufficient to raise the issue of alibi "to a conscious level in the 
minds of jurors." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, t 8; Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1044-45 (recogni-
zing the evidence was sufficient for the defense although the State maintained that based 
on the alibi, it was possible for the defendant to commit the assault). Consequently, the 
trial court was required to properly instruct the jury on the issues. See Torres, 619 P.2d at 
695-96; Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1046; Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, Nflf 11-12, 16. 
Yet the trial court here provided no instruction to the juty on the matter. See R. 
177-195. In addition, defense counsel did not request an instruction on the affirmative 
defense. See, e.g., R. 285:85-96, 138-43 (making no reference to the defense). 
Instead, the trial court advised the jury that it would receive all instructions 
necessary to the case. See R. 181 (stating the court would instfuct the jury on the 
applicable law); 184 (stating the instructions would embody "411 of the rules of law that 
may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict55); 177 (stating the jury 
must decide the case based on the law as explained in the instructions). It instructed the 
jury generally with respect to the presumption of innocence. $geR. 177; 179; 182. And 
it instructed the jury with respect to the prosecution's burden 0f proof. R. 177; 182 and 
179 (stating the burden "is always on the prosecution to prove Iguilt beyond a reasonable 
doubt55 and the burden "never shifts to the defendant for the lai/v never imposes upon a 
defendant in a criminal case the burden or duty of calling any fitnesses or producing any 
evidence55; also stating "[t]he prosecution has the burden55 and "[t]he defendant isn't 
required to prove innocence - you must start by assuming it55);| 184 (stating "[t]he burden 
remains with the prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant testifies or not, to 
prove the defendant's guilt beyond a reasonable doubt'5). 
Also, the court explained that the State was required to prove its case beyond a 
reasonable doubt. See_ R. 179 (stating that before the jury "cart give up your assumption 
that the defendant is innocent, you must be convinced that the defendant's guilt has been 
proven beyond a reasonable doubt"; also stating the "prosecution has the burden of 
proving the defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. . . . Proof beyond a reasonable 
doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the defendant's guilt. . . . If, based on 
your consideration of the evidence, you're firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty 
of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think there's a 
real possibility that he's not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find 
he's not guilty"); 182 (stating that a plea of not guilty "casts upon the prosecution the 
burden of proving each [element of the offense] to your satisfaction and beyond a 
reasonable doubt"); 182-83 (explaining the presumption of innocence and the 
prosecution's burden of proof beyond a reasonable doubt). The court repeated the 
reasonable-doubt standard in connection with advising the jury that it would have to find 
specifically listed elements for each crime to convict. R. 187, 189, 193. 
Those instructions, while pertinent, were insufficient. See, e.g., Torres, 619 P.2d 
at 696. They failed to "separately instruct each jury clearly that the State must disprove 
. . . affirmative defenses[] beyond a reasonable doubt." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, f 16 
(emphasis added). The instructions failed to make plain that Lynch had no particular 
burden of proof where the defense was involved, and he "was entitled to an acquittal if 
there was any basis in the evidence from either side sufficient to create a reasonable 
doubt that the defendant was guilty of the offense.'" Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214 (citation 
omitted; emphasis in Knoll)', Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1046 (stating a jury should be 
instructed on the alibi defense); see also Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ffif 16, 20 (recognizing 
the written instructions correctly informed the jury of the prosecution's burden; yet the 
instructions failed to advise the jury with respect to the proper burdens in the context of 
an affirmative defense). Furthermore, the instructions failed to explain that "a defendant 
is not required to establish [an affirmative defense] beyond i reasonable doubt, or even 
by a preponderance of the evidence," KnolL 712 P.2d at 214^ and "the jury may acquit 
even though the evidence of [the defense] fell 'far short of establishing the justification or 
excuse by a preponderance of the evidence upon the subject.*" IcL (citation omitted); se<e 
also Spillers, 2007 UT 13, % 19; Garcia. 2001 UT App 19,1f Il2. 
The lack of instructions on an affirmative defense is ptejudicial. See_ Spillers, 
2007 UT 13, f 24 (recognizing that prejudice exists if there i$ a dispute in the evidence, 
and if there is evidence for the defense) (citing State v. Knigh^ 2003 UT App 354, f 17, 
79 P.3d 969). The trial court's failure to properly instruct the|jury on the relevant law 
"'presumptively affects the outcome of the trial. . . [and] our (confidence in the verdict is 
undermined.'" IcL at f 24 (quoting Knight 2003 UT App 354|, 117); see also Potter, 627 
P.2d at 78 (stating defendant was denied a fair trial "on the critical issues of the case" 
where the instructions were "so general" they "could have milled and confused the 
jury"). Moreover, since the jury received no instructions witty regard to the parties' 
burdens in the context of a defense, the void undermined confidence in the jury process. 
There is no basis for believing that the jury properly applied tlie law since it was not 
informed as to how to consider the alibi defense. See, e.g., Sa\inders, 22 P.2d at 1046 
(reversing the conviction where instructions on alibi were lacking). On that basis, this 
Court may reverse the convictions for a new trial. 
B. THIS COURT MAY DECIDE THE ISSUE HERE UNDER THE PLAIN-
ERROR OR MANIFEST-INJUSTICE DOCTRINE, OR UNDER THE 
INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUNSEL ANALYSIS. 
Utah courts have ruled that the trial court has a duty to provide proper instructions 
to the jury even where defense counsel has not objected to instructions or requested his 
own. See Shumway, 2002 UT 124 (reversing for a new trial where defense counsel did 
not request proper instructions relating to extreme-emotional-distress manslaughter and 
imperfect-legal-justification manslaughter, and the record supported plain error); see also 
State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ffif 22-32, 984 P.2d 376 (stating defense counsel provided 
ineffective assistance in failing to request a cautionary instruction on eyewitness 
identification, where defendant's only defense at trial was that eyewitnesses were 
unreliable); Wgid, 67 P.2d at 651 (recognizing that in a case of alibi, an instruction ought 
to have been given on the defense even though the defendant "made no request" for an 
instruction); State v. Hittle* No. 20070108-CA, 2008 UT App 100 (unpublished) (stating 
the defendant and State "agree that the trial court erred in failing to instruct the jury that 
the State was required to disprove Hittle's affirmative defense beyond a reasonable 
doubt"); Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^ f 20 (ruling the trial court committed plain error when 
it failed to adequately instruct on the State's burden and self defense). 
In this case, Lynch did not object to the instructions or request specific instructions 
relating to the alibi defense. See R. 285:85-96, 138-142. Those circumstances are plain 
from the record. Nevertheless, this Court may review the merits of the first issue on 
appeal for plain error, manifest injustice, or ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(1) Plain Error and Manifest Injustice. 
To establish plain error, defendant must show that "(1) the instructions were] 
erroneous; (2) the error should have been obvious to the trial pourt; and (3) but for the 
error, there would be a 'reasonable likelihood for a more favorable outcome for the 
defendant.5" State v. Saunders, 1999 UT 59, f 62 n.4, 992 P.£d 951 (citation omitted). 
The manifest-injustice doctrine is similar. See Alinas, 2007 UT 83, ^ f 10 (stating 
manifest injustice is most often synonymous with plain error)t 
The Utah Supreme Court applied the manifest-injustic$ doctrine in State v. 
Boston, 846 P.2d 1276 (Utah 1993). The defendant there wa$ charged with attempted 
murder. The State advanced alternative theories for the offense, and the defendant was 
convicted. ML at 1277 & n.l. This Court affirmed, State v. Huston, 811 P.2d 929 (Utah 
App. 1991), and the defendant filed a petition for writ of certiorari arguing the conviction 
should be reversed since the instructions allowed the jury to convict for attempted de-
praved indifference murder. See Haston, 846 P.2d at 1277. Tbe supreme court addressed 
the merits of the issue even though the defendant had not preserved it in the trial court. 
See id_ It considered the instructions and ruled that attempted Idepraved indifference 
murder was not a crime under Utah law. See^ UL It reversed the defendant's conviction 
and stated that "failure to consider defendant's assigned error merely because he was 
tardy or inartful in raising the issue previously strikes us as manifestly unjust." IcL 
Under both the plain-error and the manifest-injustice doctrines, the jury 
instructions here lend themselves to review. As set forth abovp, the instructions violated 
established law as set forth in Low, 2008 UT 58, ^ 29; Torres, [619 P.2d at 695-96; 
Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1045-46; Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ffif 8-9; and Hittle, 2008 UT 
App 100. See_ supra Part LA., herein. 
Where there is evidence of an affirmative defense, the trial court must "separately 
instruct each jury clearly that the State must disprove . . . affirmative defenses[] beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 16. The trial court must make plain that 
the defendant has no particular burden where the affirmative defense is concerned, but 
may be entitled to an acquittal if there is any basis in the evidence from either side to 
create a reasonable doubt. See Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214; Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1046 (stating 
a jury should be instructed to acquit if alibi evidence considered "in connection with all 
the other evidence in the case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the defendant"). 
Furthermore, "a defendant is not required to establish [an affirmative defense] beyond a 
reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance of the evidence." Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214. 
And "the jury may acquit even though the evidence of [the defense] fell 'far short of 
establishing the justification or excuse by a preponderance of the evidence upon the 
subject.'" IcL (citation omitted); see also Spillers, 2007 UT 13, Tf 19; Garcia, 2001 UT 
App 19, f 11 (stating the defendant does not bear any burden where a defense is at issue). 
The instructions in this case failed to advise the jury of the relevant concepts. See R. 
177-195. Yet witnesses presented evidence concerning Lynch's alibi defense. See supra 
pp. 24-25, herein. It was his sole defense at trial. The instructions were deficient 
resulting in error for the first prong of the plain-error analysis. 
Next, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. Obvious or "patent" 
error exists if case law governs the matter, and the trial court failed to comply with that 
law. See Saunders, 1999 UT 59, ffl[ 62-64 (obvious error existed where applicable case 
law governed); Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^  18 (stating settled law on the matter supports 
obvious error). Established law governed the issue here. See \supra Part I.A., herein. 
In Hittle, 2008 UT App 100, the defendant was charge^ with criminal nonsupport. 
Id. He maintained he was "unable to provide support due to h[is involuntary under-
employment and involuntary unemployment." Id, His claims "raised an affirmative 
defense." Id, Yet the trial court failed to instruct the jury "thfrt the State was required to 
disprove Hittle's affirmative defense beyond a reasonable doi^bt." IcL This Court 
vacated Hittle's convictions and remanded the case for a new trial. IcL 
In Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, the defendant was charge^ with murder. The 
defendant maintained he was acting in self defense. IcL at Tffi 2-3. At trial, the court 
instructed the jury "correctly" on the "general burden of proofland of who carried it." IcL 
at 116. Notwithstanding the instructions, the jury expressed qonfusion during delibera-
tions about the definition of "unlawful" in the context of self defense. IcL at ^ 3-5, 14-
16. The court gave various supplemental instructions defining "unlawful", and as the 
confusion persisted, id. at f^l[ 3-5, the court advised the jury th$t "if [they] determine[d] 
self defense in this case then the verdict is not guilty as to either the initial [murder] 
charge or the [manslaughter] charge because the shooting is justified. Is that clear?" IcL 
at f^ 5. The jury continued deliberations and rendered a verdict for manslaughter, and the 
defendant appealed. IcL at f 1. He claimed the instructions w?re inadequate as to "the 
burden of proof of self-defense. Because Garcia did not object on the record to the jury 
instructions at trial, he [could] only obtain relief by demonstrating plain error." Id. at j^ 6. 
Under the plain-error analysis, this Court considered the instructions as a whole 
and recognized the written instructions generally advised the jury as to the prosecution's 
burden of proof. IdL at ^ 13, 16. Moreover, on appeal, the defendant did not complain 
that the trial court's explanation for "unlawful" was improper. See, e.g., icL at «[ffl 1, 6, 7. 
Nevertheless, the Court reversed for plain error where the trial court did not fully advise 
the jury on the proper burdens of proof in the context of an affirmative defense. Id. at f 
16. Indeed, given the absence of an instruction on the matter, jurors may have inferred 
that the burden for the affirmative defense "was on either party." Id. Because of that 
possibility, the Court could not allow the conviction to stand. Id. atf 19. 
The above cases govern here. The written instructions in Lynch's case were 
deficient. See supra pp. 25-27. While the jury in Garcia expressed confusion over the 
term "unlawful," 2001 UT App 19, ffl[ 3-5, that circumstance is irrelevant.1 Under 
established law, the trial court is required to instruct the jury "concerning the burden of 
proof as to [an affirmative defense]," without regard to actual jury confusion. Torres, 
619 P.2d at 695-96; see Knoll 111 P.2d at 214. Indeed, Utah courts have "explicitly and 
firmly emphasizefd]" the "long-standing law of this State concerning the procedural 
principles that govern when and how the issue of [an affirmative defense] is properly 
1
 The defendant in Garcia had a rare glimpse into jury confusion. Typically, a defendant 
would have no opportunity to pierce the confidentiality of the jury in order to assess 
whether inadequate instructions actually created confusion or were misleading. More-
over, Utah courts do not require the defendant to demonstrate that the jury experienced 
actual confusion due to inadequate instructions. Where the trial court has provided 
inadequate instructions, Utah courts have reversed for a new trial. See, e.g., Torres, 619 
P.2d at 695; Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1045-46. That is appropriate since deficient 
instructions necessarily create a void in the process that may be impossible to measure. 
raised and the allocation of the burden of persuasion with respect to that issue." Knoll, 
111 P.2d at 214; see also Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 18. B^sed on the law {see Low, 
2008 UT 58, f 29; Knoll 111 P.2d at 214; Torres. 619 P.2d # 695-96; Saunders, 22 P.2d 
at 1045-46; Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, fflf 8-9; mdHittle, 200|8 UT App 100), the error 
here should have been obvious to the trial court. Since failure to adhere to case law 
constitutes obvious error, the second prong of the plain-error analysis is established. See 
Torres, 619 P.2d at 695-96; Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, % 18. 
Under the third prong of plain error, the error was prejudicial. "c[E]rror is harmful 
[if] absent the error, there is a reasonable likelihood of a more favorable outcome for [the 
defendant]."5 Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, If 19 (citations omitted). In this case, witnesses 
presented evidence of Lynch's alibi defense. Lynch maintained he was not involved in 
the incident, but was at Costco on the afternoon of October 3. See, e.g., R. 284:36, 38, 
47-50, 96. His alibi was corroborated by receipts and testimony that Anderson reviewed 
a videotape of Lynch at Costco. R. 284:19-20, 22, 109-13; State's Exhibit 86; supra pp. 
24-25, herein. Moreover, the State's case relied on circumstantial evidence. No one 
witnessed the incident. See R. 284:10; 285:130. Several individuals reported various 
trucks in the area. R. 284:10-11, 13, 16-17, 24; 285:114-15, l£8-29. Information about 
the pickup that Lynch purchased came from Nancy Scott, a woman he had been dating. 
R. 283:112; 284:116, 135-37,209-10. Scott was upset at Lynch. See R. 284:127-28. 
In addition, the State presented inconclusive and at times conflicting information 
about the pickup truck. Specifically, Anderson testified that i\ had a deformation or dent 
on the hood and a hair swipe or smear to suggest it was connected to the incident. R. 
283:119, 124-27; State's Exhibits 28, 29, 31. Yet an expert tested hair and a swab from 
the truck and was unable to connect the evidence to Rothermich. R. 285: 20-23. 
Also, State witnesses described Rothermich's injuries, including a serious tear to 
her calf. R. 283:59, 131, 134, 136. DNA expert Todd Rigley testified that given the calf 
injury, he would expect to see "a lot of blood or tissue" on the truck. R. 285:27. Yet he 
found no evidence of Rothermich's DNA anywhere. R. 285:21-23, 27. Moreover, 
measurements of the truck did not line up specifically with injuries on Rothermich. See 
283:106; State's Exhibit 76 (identifying injuries on Rothermich at 13.7 inches on the left 
calf, 11.4 inches on the right calf, 29.9 inches on the left buttocks, 35.8 and 36.2 inches 
on the lower back, and 49.2 inches on the center of the back); compare with R. 283:132-
36; State's Exhibit 37, 38, 39, 40, 41 (measuring the truck and identifying the bottom of 
the spoiler at 11 inches, the top of the spoiler at approximately 15 inches, a tow hook at 
13.5 inches, the bumper at approximately 22.7 inches, the bottom of the grill at 
approximately 24 inches, the top of the grill at 37 inches, and the hood at approximately 
41 to 42 inches). Anderson stated the comparisons were "very close." R. 283:136. He 
stated, "[t]here were some similarities to the injuries on the victim [and] items on the 
front of the truck." R. 283:136. Yet the measurements were not a match. 
And Adamson presented testimony about the mileage on the 1993 Chevy truck. 
Specifically, the truck had an additional 18 miles on it from when Joseph Taylor traded it 
in. R. 285:77. Based on that information, Adamson clocked the mileage from the auto 
auction to Ostler's garage, then to the boarded-up property at Holladay Boulevard to 
Haven Lane and back to the Holladay Boulevard property. R. 285:78-79. The total 
amount was 12.2 miles. R. 285:79. Notably, Adamson did npt compute mileage from 
the dealerships to the auto auction. See R. 285:123-28 (stating Taylor traded the truck in 
to the Brent Brown dealership and from there the truck went t0 RC Automotive, then to 
the auto auction); State's Exhibits 80-82. Yet those amounts Would have been relevant to 
the calculation, since excessive miles would dispute the truck'|s involvement in the 
incident. In that regard, the evidence was inconclusive. 
With respect to other evidence, officers located zip ties iat the scene and white 
paint on Rothermich's clothing. R. 283:81-86, 93-97; State's Exhibits 18-20, 47-51, 77. 
Yet zip ties are so accessible that one witness brought his own|to trial. R. 283:83. 
In addition, the evidence supported that zip ties from th£ scene had white paint on 
them. (R. 284:11; 285:122). Jennifer McNair processed the z|p ties (see, e.g., R. 284:11; 
285:106, 122-23), but did not disclose her procedures to Davi4 Wakefield, the person 
who examined the zip ties for similarities. See R. 285:46. In fact, Wakefield did not 
observe paint on the zip ties. R. 285:45. Moreover, WakefielcJ did not know the degree 
to which the zip ties were processed or scraped before he exanlined them. See R. 285:45-
46. The evidence presented conflicts and questions for the jury to resolve. 
As for the paint transfers, McNair testified that the paints she tested were 
manufactured in bulk and may be seen on multiple vehicles. R. 284:181, 202. Also, 
McNair matched paint from Rothermich's clothing to the trucl^ and to unused cans of 
aerosol paint. R. 284:194-201. Since the aerosol cans that McNair tested were unused, it 
was unlikely that paint from those cans somehow transferred t0 Rothermich's clothing. 
Nevertheless, McNair testified that the paint from the cans wa$ the same distinct type of 
paint found on the pants. R. 284:198-99. Her testimony only demonstrated that the white 
paint was accessible and common. Moreover, McNair explained that paint matching is 
not an exact science. R. 284:202; see also R. 284:181. 
The State's evidence also intimated that Lynch was involved in the matter for 
financial gain. See_ R. 284:76, 98, 109. Yet, the State presented no proof that Lynch 
stood to gain anything financially from his wife's death. See, e.g.. State's Exhibit 94 at 
27:20 (stating Rothermich left everything "to her kids"). 
Notably, the prejudice analysis does not ask whether the evidence was sufficient to 
convict, but whether the error deprived the defendant of a fair trial. See, e.g.. State v. 
Mitchell 779 P.2d 1116, 1121-22 (Utah 1989). Where the trial court failed to instruct the 
jury on the defendant's case, that void effectively would prevent the jury from 
considering the defense, resulting in a substantial deprivation. Moreover, when evidence 
is conflicting or susceptible to different interpretations, the court's failure to instruct on 
the defendant's case affects the deliberation process and the outcome of the trial, "'[and] 
our confidence in the verdict is undermined.'" Spillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 24 (cite omitted). 
Because the jury instructions failed to "separately instruct each jury clearly that 
the State must disprove . . . affirmative defenses[] beyond a reasonable doubt," Garcia, 
2001 UT App 19, ^ f 16 (emphasis added), "'[w]e cannot say'" that the jury properly 
considered the matter here. IcL at <J 19 (citation omitted). In addition, where the trial 
court failed to instruct that "the jury may acquit even though the evidence of [the 
defense] fell 'far short of establishing the justification or excuse by a preponderance of 
the evidence upon the subject,'" Knoll 712 P.2d at 214 (citation omitted), that void in the 
instructions effectively deprived Lynch of the defense and presented the jury from 
considering it. See_ Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1046 (stating a jury should be instructed that the 
defendant should be acquitted if alibi evidence considered "in (connection with all the 
other evidence in the case, raises a reasonable doubt as to the $uilt of the defendant"). If 
the alibi defense had been properly explained to the jury, it is Reasonably likely that given 
the conflicts in the evidence and the circumstantial nature of the case, the defense would 
have created a reasonable doubt as to guilt. "Because the trial Icourt committed error that 
was both obvious and prejudicial," this Court may "conclude that the trial court 
committed plain error." Garcia, 2001 UT App 19,119. 
(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
Since Lynch's trial counsel failed to object to the deficiency in the instructions, 
this Court may address the issue under the ineffective-assistan^e-of-counsel doctrine. 
The Sixth Amendment to the federal constitution provides a criminal defendant with the 
right to the effective assistance of counsel. See Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 
687-88 (1984). To establish a claim of ineffective assistance, k defendant must show that 
(1) his attorney's acts or omissions "fell below an objective standard of reasonableness," 
and (2) "cthere is a reasonable probability that, but for counseljs unprofessional errors, 
the result of the proceeding would have been different.'" Statq v. Powell, 2007 UT 9, f 
45, 154 P.3d 788 (footnotes omitted); see also State v. Holland 876 P.2d 357, 359 (Utah 
1994) (stating "defendants are wholly dependent on the dedication of their attorneys to 
protect their interests and to ensure their fair treatment under the law"); Osborn v. 
Shillinzer, 861 F.2d 612, 629 (10th Cir. 1988) (ineffective assistance of counsel claim 
affirmed where counsel's assistance was not reliable). Also, this Court has stated, 
Because courts "give trial counsel wide latitude in making tactical decisions," they 
"will not question such decisions unless there is no reasonable basis supporting 
them." State v. Crosby. 927 P.2d 638, 644 (Utah 1996). Thus, to succeed on a 
claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, Defendant must "rebut the strong 
presumption that under the circumstances, the challenged action might be 
considered sound trial strategy." State v. Litherland. 2000 UT 76, \ 19, 12 P.3d 92 
(quotations and citations omitted). 
State v. Hernandez, 2005 UT App 546, \ 17, 128 P.3d 556; Powell 2007 UT 9, f 46. 
The first prong of the ineffective-assistance-of-counsel analysis is obvious on the 
face of the record. On the last day of trial, the judge discussed jury instructions. R. 285: 
85-96, 138-143. Defense counsel did not request an instruction on the alibi defense. R. 
285:85-96, 138-143. Counsel's acts or omissions failed to meet an objective standard of 
reasonableness. See Strickland, 466 U.S. at 690 (discussing the first step). 
The case of State v. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, is instructive. There the Utah Supreme 
Court considered trial counsel's failure to request a cautionary instruction in a case where 
"[t]he only defense available to [the defendant] at trial was the unreliability of the eyewit-
ness identifications." I(L at f 25. The court recognized that earlier cases summarized 
studies for eyewitness identifications. IdL Also, case law "concluded that, if requested, a 
trial court must give a cautionary eyewitness identification instruction in every case 
where identification is a central issue." IcL at f^ 26. The court then considered the issue in 
the context of ineffective assistance of counsel, and ruled that counsel should request 
instructions relevant to the defendant's case "unless obvious tactical reasons exist to 
forego an instruction." M at f 28. In Maestas's case, trial counsel did nothing to 
"educate the jury with respect to the factors set forth in [case law]." M at ^ 30. 
Based on its analysis, the Utah Supreme Court ruled that "trial counsel rendered 
objectively deficient performance by failing to request a cautionary eyewitness 
identification instruction that would have informed the jury of the unreliability of 
eyewitness identifications. The record does not reveal any reasonable tactic that would 
ameliorate or explain that deficiency." IcL at ^ 32 (footnote Emitted). 
For the reasons stated in Maestas, the record here supports ineffective assistance 
of counsel. Specifically, "[t]he only defense available to [th$ defendant] at trial" in this 
case, id^dX^ 25, was alibi. See supra pp. 24-25 (summarizing alibi evidence). Utah law 
recognizes the need for proper instructions for the defendant'ls case and for an affirmative 
defense. See Knoll 712 P.2d at 214; Torres, 619 P.2d at 695J-96; Saunders, 22 P.2d at 
1046; Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, ^ f 16. Yet defense counsel h^re failed to request proper 
instructions for the alibi defense. See R. 285:85-96, 138-43. 
Based on the record, there was no sound justification fbr counsel's failure to re-
quest legally sufficient instructions on the defense. If counsel had requested instructions, 
the trial judge would have given them so that the jury could consider the evidence in the 
proper context. See Torres, 619 P.2d at 695-96; Saunders, 22|P.2d at 1045-46; Hanna, 
21 P.2d at 539. Indeed, the record shows that defense counsel) was aware of the defense, 
where he discussed it in arguments to the jury. See R. 285:18|2-83, 185. Yet, defense 
counsel's references in closing argument were not an adequate substitute for proper 
instructions. According to the Utah Supreme Court, if the evidence supports the defense, 
instructions must be given to the jury. See Low, 2008 UT 58, f 29; Potter, 627 P.2d at 
78 (stating the defendant was denied "a fair trial on the critical issues of the case" where 
the instructions were deficient); Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1045-56; Hittle, 2008 UT App 100. 
The defendant has a right to have "his theory of the case presented to the jury in a clear 
and understandable way." Potter, 627 P.2d at 78 (footnote omitted). In this case, proper 
instructions would have given the jury context and guidance. See, e.g., R. 177 
(admonishing the jury to "decide the case based upon the law" in the instructions). 
Moreover, counsel's statements in closing argument were an inadequate substitute 
since the court admonished the jury to obey the law as set forth in the instructions (R. 
177, 181, 184), and it admonished the jury not to consider as evidence statements made 
by counsel unless the statements constituted a stipulation. R. 185. 
Since defense counsel failed to request adequate instructions, the jury was not 
properly advised in the law. The record here is devoid of instructions concerning the 
State's burden in the context of an affirmative defense, and it is devoid of instructions 
advising the jury to acquit "even though the evidence of [the defense] fell 'far short of 
establishing the [defense] by a preponderance of the evidence upon the subject.'" Knoll, 
712 P.2d at 214 (citation omitted). 
"[T]rial counsel rendered objectively deficient performance" by failing to request 
proper instructions with respect to the defense. Maestas, 1999 UT 32, ^ 32. "The record 
does not reveal any reasonable tactic that would ameliorate or explain that deficiency." 
IcL, see also State v. Moritzsky, 111 P.2d 688, 692 (Utah Ct. App. 1989) (ruling there was 
"no tactical explanation" for counsel's failure to request a proper instruction on the 
defense of habitation). The first prong of the analysis is satislfied. 
Under the second prong of the analysis, the absence of proper instructions relevant 
to Lynch's defense "seriously undermined the fairness of this| trial." Maestas, 1999 UT 
32, \ 34. "Counsel's omission went to the heart of the defens|e," zd,, in this case, alibi. 
In Garcia, this Court ruled that deficiencies in the instruction^ were prejudicial because 
the jury could have inferred that the defendant had some responsibility with respect to the 
affirmative defense or that the State had limited responsibilities in disproving it. See 
Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, Tf 19. Because that possibility existed, the Court could not 
allow the conviction to stand. hL at fl 19-20. 
In State v. Moore, 2009 UT App 386, - P.3d --, this C0urt ruled that when defense 
counsel fails to argue a particular defense that is suggested by |the evidence, the deficient 
performance is prejudicial if there is a reasonable probability that "with such a defense 
the jury 'would have had a reasonable doubt respecting guilt.5*' IdL at \ 8 (cite omitted). 
Also, the Court stated that under the "reasonable probability" $tandard, "'a defendant 
need not show that counsel's deficient conduct more likely th^n not altered the outcome 
in the case.' Rather, '[t]he result of a proceeding can be rendered unreliable, and hence 
the proceeding itself unfair, even if the errors of counsel cannot be shown by a prepon-
derance of the evidence to have determined the outcome.'" Id\ (internal cites omitted). 
The above principles apply here. In this case, as stated $upra, the State relied on 
inconclusive, circumstantial, and sometimes conflicting evidence for the offenses. See 
supra pp. 33-37, herein; see also State v. Verde, 770 P.2d 116, ,124 n.15 (Utah 1989) 
(stating the prejudice prong for ineffective assistance is similail to the prejudice for plain 
error). In addition, State witnesses presented evidence of alibi. See supra pp. 24-25. 
There is a reasonable probability that if the jury had been properly instructed, it would 
have considered the alibi defense to create a reasonable doubt as to guilt. See, e.g., 
Saunders, 22 P.2d at 1045-46 (stating it is not necessary for alibi evidence to prove it 
would have been impossible for the defendant to commit the crime; rather, evidence may 
be "taken into consideration with all the other evidence in the case," to create a 
reasonable doubt as to guilt). Proper instructions would have made plain to the jury that 
as it sifted through the issues, defendant had no burden where the affirmative defense was 
concerned, but would be entitled to an acquittal if there was any basis in the evidence 
from either side for reasonable doubt. See Knoll, 1YI P.2d at 214; Saunders, 22 P.2d at 
1046. Also, proper instructions would have explained that "a defendant is not required to 
establish [an affirmative defense] beyond a reasonable doubt, or even by a preponderance 
of the evidence," Knoll, 712 P.2d at 214, and "the jury may acquit even though the 
evidence of [the defense] fell 'far short of establishing the justification or excuse by a 
preponderance of the evidence upon the subject.'" IdL (citation omitted); see also 
Svillers, 2007 UT 13, \ 19; Garcia, 2001 UT App 19, \ 12. 
Because trial counsel was deficient in his performance, the jury had no guidance in 
the matter. The lack of instructions on alibi prevented the jury from considering Lynch's 
defense. Consequently, the results of the proceedings were unreliable and the proceedings 
themselves were unfair. See, e.g., Moore, 2009 UT App 386, f 8 (discussing prejudice 
analysis). Lynch has established prejudice. He asks this Court to reverse the convictions. 
II. THE PROSECUTOR ENGAGED IN MISCONpUCT. 
A. THE PROSECUTOR URGED JURORS TO CONSIDER MATTERS 
OUTSIDE THE EVIDENCE. 
"In our judicial system, the prosecution's responsibility is that of a minister of 
justice and not simply that of an advocate." State v. Todd. 2007 UT App 349, \ 17, 173 
P.3d 170 (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Thp prosecutor has "a duty to 
see that the defendant is accorded procedural justice and that ^uilt is decided upon the 
basis of sufficient evidence." Id, (internal quotation marks an# citations omitted). "Thus, 
'the conduct of the prosecutor at closing argument is [appropriately] circumscribed by the 
concern for the right of a defendant to a fair and impartial trial]."' Id, (citations omitted). 
"Prosecutors are held to a high standard regarding theirl conduct, given 'the pos-
sibility that the jury will give special weight to the prosecutor' |s arguments, not only 
because of the prestige associated with the prosecutor's office,! but also because of the 
fact-finding facilities presumably available to the office.'" 7(i. [(quoting ABA Stds for 
Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, StcJ 3-5.8, cmt. (1993)) (other 
citation omitted). "[WJhile prosecutors must have the freedom to present closing 
argument with logical force, they must also act within the constraints imposed upon their 
office." Id at 118 (citing Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.8 & cmt. 1|); see Ross, 2007 UT 89, K 
55. "Accordingly, '[t]he prosecutor should refrain from argument which would divert the 
jury from its duty to decide the case on the evidence.'" Todd, J2007 UT App 349, If 18 
(quoting ABA Stds for Crim. Justice: Prosecution Function and Defense Function, Std 3-
5.8(d) (1993)); see also State v. Buck, 2009 UT App 2 4 18, 200 P.3d 674 (stating 
prosecutors should refrain from improper argument). 
To determine whether remarks by the prosecutor in closing argument '"are so 
objectionable as to merit a reversal in a criminal case,'" this Court employs a two-part 
test: (1) "did the remarks call to the attention of the jurors matters which they would not 
be justified in considering in determining their verdict," and (2) were the jurors "probably 
influenced by those remarks.'" Ross, 2007 UT 89, ^ f 54 (citation omitted). The "two-part 
test must be applied 'under the circumstances of the particular case.'" Id_ at f^ 54 (citation 
omitted). 
The first prong is met if the prosecutor "encourage[s] jurors to consider matters 
outside the evidence." State v. Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 59, 979 P.2d 799 (citations 
omitted); see State v. Hopkins, 782 P.2d 475, 478 (Utah 1989) ("[C]ounsel is precluded 
from arguing matters not in evidence."); State v. Painter, 860 P.2d 339, 344 (Utah Ct. 
App.) ("A comment by a prosecutor during closing argument that the jury consider 
matters outside the evidence is prosecutorial misconduct."), cert denied, 868 P.2d 95 
(Utah 1993). According to the rules of professional conduct, "a lawyer may not 'allude 
to any matter that the lawyer does not reasonably believe is relevant or that will not be 
supported by admissible evidence.'" Todd, 2007 UT App 349, j^ 22 (quoting Utah R. 
Profl Conduct 3.4(e)). Indeed, "[a] prosecutor's 'suggestion] to the jury that they 
consider and "deliberate" matters outside the evidence' constitutes prosecutorial 
misconduct." M (citations omitted); see Saunders, 1999 UT 59, fflf 28-29. 
Under the second prong of the prosecutorial-misconduct test, this Court will 
consider the case as a whole. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, fflf 33, 35 (citation omitted). If 
"'"proof of defendant's guilt is strong, the challenged condujct or remark will not be 
presumed prejudicial."555 Ross. 2007 UT 89, f 54 (citation omitted); see. Todd, 2007 UT 
App 349, fflf 33, 35 (citation omitted). Improper comments require reversal "'only if 
[they] substantially affected the defendant's right to a fair triM."5 Todd, 2007 UT App 
349, f 31 (citations omitted). "'[F]or an error to require reversal, the likelihood of a 
different outcome must be sufficiently high to undermine corifidence in the verdict.555 lei 
(citation omitted). Moreover, the prejudicial effect of prosecutorial misconduct may be 
reduced if "defense counsel addressed the improper statements5' during closing argument, 
or if "the trial court gave a curative instruction.55 IcL at f 34 (Citation omitted). 
On the other hand, when evidence is "'circumstantial c^ r sufficiently conflicting, 
jurors are more likely influenced by an improper argument.555 IcL at f^ 35. In those cases, 
jurors '"may be especially susceptible to influence, and a small degree of influence may 
be sufficient to affect the verdict.555 State v. Span. 819 P.2d 3^9, 335 (Utah 1991) 
(citation omitted). Also, counsel is obligated '"to avoid, as fait as possible, any reference 
to those matters the jury is not justified in considering.55' Statq v. Finlayson, 956 P.2d 
283, 292 (Utah Ct. App. 1998) (quoting State v. Troy, 688 P.2cJ 483, 486-87 (Utah 
1984)). "If prosecutorial misconduct is established, the State riiust show that the error 
was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt." Ross, 2007 UT 89, ftf 54 (citation omitted). 
In this case, the prosecutor represented in final rebuttal statements that when 
Lynch encountered "his best friend" at the hospital after Rotheijinich died, he walked up 
to his friend "and the first thing he says [is 'w]hat have I - whajt am I going to do without 
her? What have I done?'He killed his wife." R. 285:193. Th0 prosecutor intimated in 
statements to the jury that Lynch confessed. Yet Lynch did not confess by saying "What 
have I done." In fact, Lynch5s neighbor Don Carter testified that when he saw Lynch at 
the hospital, Lynch stated, '"What have I,' then immediately corrected and said, 'What 
am I going to do?'" R. 284:67, 78. The prosecutor's conduct in representing to the jury 
that Lynch completed the statement with a confession was misleading and inappropriate. 
The misstatement "encourage[d] jurors to consider matters outside the evidence." 
Bakalov, 1999 UT 45, f 59 (citations omitted); see Todd, 2007 UT App 349, t 22 (stating 
a lawyer may not allude to matters '"that will not be supported by admissible evidence'") 
(quoting Utah R. Prof 1 Conduct 3.4(e)). The record establishes the first step for 
prosecutorial misconduct. 
With regard to the second step, under the circumstances of this case, jurors were 
'"probably influenced by those remarks.'" Ross, 2007 UT 89, f 54 (citation omitted). 
'"[Cjonfessions have [a] profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may justifiably 
doubt [the jury's] ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so.'" Arizona v. 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 296 (1991) (citation omitted). A jury is tempted to rely on a 
confession "alone in reaching its decision." IcL The effect can be pervasive. Id, 
Moreover, in this case, the evidence was circumstantial and at times in conflict or 
inconclusive. See supra pp. 33-37, herein. Thus, the prosecutor's misstatement about a 
confession likely persuaded the jury to make inferences where direct evidence was 
lacking. In that regard, the prosecutor's misstatements substantially affected Lynch's 
right to a fair trial. The misstatement about a confession likely was relevant to the jury in 
shaping interpretations and inferences for the convictions. See Span, 819 P.2d at 335 
(recognizing that jurors may be "'especially susceptible to influence'" when evidence is 
circumstantial, conflicting) (citation omitted). That supports [prejudice. 
B. THIS COURT MAY DECIDE THE ISSUE UNDfeR THE PLAIN-ERROR 
OR THE INEFFECTIVE-ASSISTANCE-OF-COUN^EL ANALYSIS 
(X) Plain Error. 
As stated supra Part I.B.(l), for plain error, a defendant must show (1) an error, 
(2) that should have been obvious to the trial court, and (3) prejudice: "but for the error, 
there would be a 'reasonable likelihood for a more favorable outcome for the 
defendant.'" Saunders, 1999 UT 59,162 n. 4 (citation omitted). In this case, the first 
and second steps are plain from the record. The prosecutor "3ncourage[d] jurors to 
consider matters outside the evidence." Bakalov, 1999 UT 45|, f 59 (citations omitted). 
The prosecutor's statement that Lynch confessed constituted prosecutorial misconduct. 
Todd* 2007 UT App 349, If 22 (stating "[a] prosecutor's csuggpst[ion] to the jury that they 
consider and "deliberate" matters outside the evidence' constitutes prosecutorial 
misconduct") (citations omitted). The prosecutorial miscondupt would have been 
obvious to the trial court based both on the law and facts. 
Specifically, the trial court is charged with knowing thq law and applying it. See 
Utah Code of Judicial Conduct, Canon 3.B.(2) (2009) (stating M[a] judge shall apply the 
law and maintain professional competence"). Established law |at the time of trial 
specified that a prosecutor may not suggest that the jury consi4er matters outside the 
evidence. Todd, 2007 UT App 349, ^ 22. In addition, the errot would have been obvious 
to the trial court because the court presided over the trial and Would have known that 
Lynch did not confess to the offense. See, e.g., R. 284:67, 78 (reflecting Don Carter's 
testimony at trial). Where the facts and the law would have been obvious to the trial 
court, the prosecutorial misconduct qualifies as plain error under the first and second 
prongs of the analysis. 
With regard to the third prong of the analysis, in this case, the prosecutorial 
misconduct prejudiced Lynch for the reasons stated above. Specifically, the claim of a 
confession would have a "'profound impact on the jury, so much so that we may 
justifiably doubt [the juryfs] ability to put [it] out of mind even if told to do so.'" 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296 (citation omitted); supra pp. 46-47, herein. The claim of a 
confession likely caused the jury to shape interpretations and inferences in favor of the 
convictions. See Span, 819 P.2d at 335 (recognizing that jurors may be "'especially sus-
ceptible to influence'" when evidence is circumstantial, conflicting) (citation omitted). 
That is, where the circumstantial evidence for the convictions at times was 
inconclusive and conflicting (see supra pp. 33-37), the improper statements coupled with 
the lack of proper instructions for Lynch's alibi defense (see supra Part L, herein) would 
have been influential to the jury in deliberations. For those reasons, this Court may reach 
the merits of Lynch's argument for prosecutorial misconduct. Lynch respectfully asks 
this Court to reverse the convictions and to remand the case for a new trial. 
(2) Ineffective Assistance of Counsel. 
As stated supra, to establish a claim of ineffective assistance, a defendant must 
show that (1) counsel's acts or omissions "fell below an objective standard of reasonable-
ness," and (2) "'there is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel's unprofessional 
errors, the result of the proceeding would have been different^'" PowelL 2007 UT 9, f 45 
(footnotes omitted); supra Part LB.(2), herein. Also, the defendant must "'rebut the 
strong presumption5" that failure to object to prosecutorial misconduct "'might be 
considered sound strategy.5" Hernandez, 2005 UT App 546, jfl 17 (citation omitted). 
Under the first step, this Court has criticized defense counsel for failing to make 
prompt objections to prosecutorial misconduct. In Todd, defease counsel delayed in 
making objections. See 2007 UT App 349, \ 8. This Court noted that while the delay 
may have been "out of courtesy55 for the prosecutor or "a strategic maneuver,55 a timely 
and prompt objection would have "greatly curtailed55 the misconduct and allowed the trial 
court to timely address the matter. Id_zt f 44n.4. In Lynch5 $ case, defense counsel had 
no reason to delay or to forego an objection since the prosecutor made the misstatements 
in rebuttal argument. R. 285:193. As soon as the statements Were made, the jury was 
excused for deliberations. R. 285:193-94. Counsel here should have objected since he 
had no opportunity to "ameliorate the effects of the comment lt>y discussing the 
impropriety with the jurors.55 Todd, 2007 UT App 349, ^ f 41. Based on the record, 
defense counsel's failure to object may not be considered reasonable or tactical. See_ 
ABA Stds for Crim. Justice Prosecution Function and Defens^ Function, Std 4-1.2(b) (3d 
ed. 1993) (requiring defense counsel to "advocate with courage and devotion55 for the 
accused). 
Moreover, a prompt objection would have allowed the $ourt to craft a remedy, 
including declaring a mistrial. See. Troy, 688 P.2d at 486-87 (Reversing for prosecutorial 
misconduct); State v. Andreason, 718 P.2d 400,403 (Utah 198|6) (same). As stated supra. 
claims of a confession may have such an impact "'that we may justifiably doubt [the 
jury's] ability to put them out of mind even if told to do so.'" Fulminante. 499 U.S. at 296 
(citation omitted). Consequently, a curative instruction would have been inadequate. See 
also State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 262, 273 & n.9 (Utah 1998) (recognizing that curative 
instructions "are not always sufficient to avoid the potential prejudice" and "are not 
without defect or limitation"). 
As for the prejudice analysis, in this case, the State's evidence for the offenses was 
circumstantial, and at times conflicting and inconclusive. See supra pp. 33-37, herein. 
Thus, defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's misstatement allowed the 
jury to believe that Lynch confessed, and it allowed the jury to shape its interpretations 
for the circumstantial evidence to fit that context for the convictions. Indeed, the jury 
would have been "'especially susceptible to influence'" by the prosecutor's claim that 
Lynch made a confession here. See_ Span, 819 P.2d at 335 (citation omitted); see also 
Fulminante, 499 U.S. at 296. The record supports prejudice. 
CONCLUSION 
For the reasons set forth herein, Lynch respectfully requests that this Court reverse 
the convictions and remand this case for a new trial. 
SUBMITTED this ^ day of Jfltrtk^A , 2010. 
Linda M. Jones 
Patrick Corum 
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INSTRUCTIONS 
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Hon. Deno G. Himonas 
I'm now going to go over a few preliminary instructions. A|ll are equally important. 
1. GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS: Obey the instructions; you 
go against the law. You may take notes, but don't let your note-taking 
the evidence. Also, your notes aren't evidence; use them only as an 
And keep an open mind; don't form an opinion about this case until jjou 
and the lawyers' summaries and considered my final instructions to 
're not to reach decisions that 
distract you from following 
aid to your personal memory. 
've heard all of the evidence 
^ou on the law. 
2. THE ROLE OF THE JUDGE, THE JURY, AND THE LAWYERS: It's my role as 
judge to supervise the trial and to decide the legal issues. It's your role as jurors to decide the factual 
issues. These issues generally relate to who, what, where, when, and how. And it's the role of the 
lawyers to present evidence. Each lawyer will also try to persuade you to accept his or her view of 
the evidence and to decide the case in favor of his or her client. A word of caution: Neither the 
lawyers nor I actually decide the case; that's your role. So don't be influenced by what you think our 
opinions are; rather, you decide the case based upon the law, as explained in my final instructions to 
you, and the evidence presented here in court. 
3. AN OUTLINE OF HOW THE TRIAL WILL PROCEED 
first. In this portion the lawyers will outline for you what they believe 
parties will then present their evidence. The prosecution will offer 
defense. At the end of the evidence portion, I'll provide you with 
The lawyers will then argue the case to you in their closing arguments 
share with you their respective views of the evidence and how they think 
its 
the 
Opening statements come 
the evidence will show. The 
evidence first followed by the 
final instructions on the law. 
It's at this time that they'll 
you should decide the case. 
4. THE CHARGE AND THE PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE: The defendant in this 
case has been accused of committing a crime. The accusations are set forth in a document called an 
"Information". The clerk will now read the Information. The defendant has answered the 
Information by saying "not guilty". The defendant is presumed to be innocent of the charge. 
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5. THE FUNCTION OF THE JURY: It is for you to decide whether the prosecution has 
proven the charges against the defendant beyond a reasonable doubt. Your decision is called a 
"verdict". Your verdict must be based only on the evidence produced in court. And it must be based 
on facts, not on speculation. You may, however, draw reasonable inferences from the evidence. 
6. WHAT IS EVIDENCE: Generally speaking, evidence is anything that tends to prove or 
disprove the existence of a disputed fact. Examples include testimony, documents, objects, and 
photographs. At times the lawyers may agree that certain facts exist. You should accept any agreed 
or stipulated facts as having been proved. In limited instances, I may take "judicial notice" of a well-
known fact. If this happens, I'll explain how you should treat it. Also, under certain circumstances, 
witnesses are allowed to give opinion testimony. A person who by education, study, or experience 
has become an expert in any art, science, or profession, may give his or her opinion and the reason 
for it. A layman (or a non-expert) is also allowed to express an opinion if it's based on personal 
observations and helpful to understanding his or her testimony of the case. You're not bound to 
believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you would any other evidence, and give it the weight you 
think it deserves. 
7. WHAT IS NOT TO BE CONSIDERED OR USED AS EVIDENCE: I've explained 
to you what evidence is; now I'll tell you about some things that don't qualify as evidence and that 
you mustn't consider in reaching your verdict. The Information: The fact that formal charges have 
been filed accusing the defendant of committing a crime is not evidence of guilt. Potential 
punishment: You may be aware of the offense charged and the range of potential penalties, but you 
shouldn't consider what actual punishment the defendant may receive if found guilty. That's for me 
to decide based upon the applicable law. The lawyers' statements: What the lawyers say isn't 
evidence. Their purpose is to give you a preview of expected evidence and to help you understand 
the evidence from their viewpoint. The right to remain silent: If the defendant chooses not to testify, 
don't consider that as evidence of guilt. The Constitution provides that the defendant has the right 
not to testify and you mustn't draw any negative inferences based upon his or her reliance on this 
right. Personal investigation: Evidence isn't what you can find out on your own. So, don't make 
personal inspections; don't look for information in books or public or private records; and don't view 
premises, things, or articles not produced in court. And out-of-court information: Don't consider 
anything you may have heard or read about this case in the media or by other out-of-court 
communication. You must rely solely on the evidence that's produced and received in court. 
8. OBJECTIONS TO EVIDENCE: I rule on objections. If I sustain an objection, the 
evidence is kept out and you shouldn't consider it; if I overrule it, the evidence comes in and you may 
consider it. If I strike evidence, you should ignore it. 
9. HOW TO MAKE DECISIONS ABOUT THE EVIDENCE: Once evidence is 
admitted, you must decide three things about it: whether it should be believed, how important it is, 
and what you can infer or conclude from it. Use your common sense in making these decisions. 
Review all of the evidence. Don't imagine things that have no evidence to back them up. And 
consider the evidence fairly, without any bias, passion, or sympathy toward either side. 
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10. DECIDING WHETHER TO BELIEVE A WITNESS) As each witness testifies, you 
must decide how much weight to give to his or her testimony. Keep in mind that you're not required 
to believe all that a witness says. And you're entitled to believe one witness as against many or many 
as against one, in keeping with your honest convictions. In assessing a witness, it may help to ask 
yourself questions such as these: Did the witness have a bias or motive to testify a certain way? Did 
the witness make conflicting statements or contradict other evidence, and what impression did he or 
she make while answering questions? Did the witness have a good opportunity to know the facts and 
the ability to remember them, and was the testimony reasonable in lijght of human experience? 
11. WHAT IF A WITNESS PURPOSELY GIVES FALSE TESTIMONY: If you believe 
that a witness has purposely testified falsely about anything relevant to the case, you may disregard 
not only the false testimony, but all of his or her testimony, unless ij is corroborated, which means 
confirmed or supported, by other evidence (in which case you should give it the weight you think it 
deserves). 
12. QUESTIONS BY JURORS DURING THE TRIAL: Any juror may direct a question 
to me or to a witness by writing the question on a piece of paper and alerting the bailiff. I'll share the 
same with the lawyers, who have the right to express an opinion as to whether it's proper. If the 
question is improper, I'll tell you; otherwise, I'll generally allow it. I remind you, however, that the 
lawyers are trained in putting on the evidence necessary to decide this case. But if you feel there's 
something important that's been missed or that needs clarification, you may ask a question by 
complying with the procedure I've just outlined. 
13. WHO IS RESPONSIBLE TO CONVINCE THE JIjJRY: The prosecution has the 
burden of proof. It's the one making the accusations in this case. The defendant isn't required to 
prove innocence-you must start by assuming it. 
14. HOW CONVINCED MUST YOU BE TO DECIDE (&UILT: Before you can give up 
your assumption that the defendant is innocent, you must be convinced that the defendant's guilt has 
been proven beyond a reasonable doubt. This is a humane rule intended to guard against the danger 
of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
15. WHAT IS A REASONABLE DOUBT: The prosecution has the burden of proving the 
defendant guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. Some of you may have served as jurors in civil cases, 
where you were told that it's only necessary to prove that a fact is more likely true than not true. In 
criminal cases, the prosecution's proof must be more powerful jhan that. It must be beyond a 
reasonable doubt. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly convinced of the 
defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with absolute certainty, and 
in criminal cases the law doesn't require proof that overcomes every possible doubt. If, based on your 
consideration of the evidence, you're firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty of the crime 
charged, you must find him guilty. If on the other hand, you think mere's a real possibility that he's 
not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find he'|s not guilty. 
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16. WHAT RULES APPLY TO RECESSES: On occasion I'll call for a recess. It may 
be for a few minutes or longer. During recesses, don't talk about this case with anyone-not family, 
friends, or even each other. And don't mingle with the lawyers, the parties, the witnesses, or anyone 
else connected with the case. You may exchange polite greetings with these persons, but don't 
engage in conversations. Finally, don't read about this case in the newspaper or listen to any reports 
on television or radio. 
Dated this }jL day of November, 2008 
DENO G. 
DISTRICT COUR' 
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INSTRUCTION NO. 1: It's now my duty, as judge, to 
applies to this case. And it's your duty, as jurors, to follow that laiv 
instruct you as to the law that 
INSTRUCTION NO. 2: You may take the following iteitns 
jury instructions, the exhibits admitted in evidence, your notes, and 
only into the jury room: the 
the verdict form. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3: The first thing to do in the jury toom is choose a "Foreperson". 
The Foreperson's duties are to keep order, allow everyone a chance to speak, and represent the jury 
in any communications that you make. The Foreperson has no more power than any other juror in 
deciding what the verdict should be. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 4: It's rarely good for a juror, on entering the jury room, to make an 
emphatic expression of opinion or to announce a determination to stand for a certain verdict. When 
that's done, a person's pride may block appropriate consideration of the case. But don't make a 
decision just to agree with everyone else either: your verdict must be your own. Help each other 
arrive at the truth. Use your common memory, common understanding, and common sense. Talk 
about the case with each other as you ponder and deliberate. And respect and consider the opinions 
of your fellow jurors. If you're persuaded that a decision you initially made was wrong, then don't 
hesitate to change your mind. Also, don't resort to chance or som$ form of decision-making other 
than honest deliberation. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 5: If you think that you need more information or a clarification, 
write a note and give it to the bailiff. I'll review it with the lawyers and answer your question, if 
appropriate; however, these instructions, should contain all the information that you need in order 
to reach a verdict based upon the evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 6: Your duty is to decide this case and this case alone. You shouldn't 
use this case to correct perceived wrongs in other cases or to express individual or collective views 
about anything other than the guilt or innocence of the defendant. Put a little differently, your verdict 
should reflect the facts, as found by you, applied to the law explained in these instructions and 
shouldn't be distorted by any outside factors or objectives. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 7: This being a criminal case, your verdict must be unanimous on 
each element of the offense. If you all come to an agreement, then you've reached a verdict. At that 
time, the Foreperson should date and sign the verdict form that reflects your decision. The 
Foreperson should then notify the bailiff that you're ready to return to court. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 8: After you've given me the verdict form, the clerk may ask each 
of you about it to make sure that you agree with it. I'll then excuse you. Afterward, you may talk 
about the case with anyone. Likewise, you're not required to talk about it. If anyone insists on 
talking to you about the case when you don't want to, please tell the court clerk. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 9: You're instructed that the defendant, Sherman Alexander Lynch, 
m, is charged in the Information with criminal homicide (murder) and obstructing justice. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 10: You're not to consider Instruction No. 9 as a statement of facts; 
rather, you're to regard it as a summary of the allegations in the Information. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 11: The defendant has entered a plea of not guilty. The plea of not 
guilty denies each of the essential allegations of the count contained in the Information and casts 
upon the prosecution the burden of proving each to your satisfaction and beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 12: You're instructed that the mere fact that the defendant has been 
arrested, charged with this offense, and held to answer to the charge, isn't any evidence of guilt or 
even a circumstance that you should consider in determining guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 13: In arriving at a verdict, you shouldn't discuss or consider the 
subject of penalty or punishment. That's a matter for the Court and other governmental agencies and 
mustn't in any way affect your decision as to the defendant's guilt or innocence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 14: All presumptions of law, independent of evidence, are in favor 
of innocence, and a defendant is presumed innocent until proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt. 
This presumption is not a mere formality, but is a substantial part of the law intended, as far as is 
possible, to guard against the danger of an innocent person being unjustly punished. 
The presumption of innocence must continue to prevail in your minds until you're satisfied 
beyond a reasonable doubt of the guilt of the defendant. And, in the case of a reasonable doubt as 
to the defendant's guilt, he is entitled to an acquittal 
Also, the burden is always on the prosecution to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. This 
burden never shifts to the defendant for the law never imposes upon a defendant in a criminal case 
the burden or duty of calling any witnesses or producing any evidence. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 15: Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves you firmly 
convinced of the defendant's guilt. There are very few things in this world that we know with 
absolute certainty, and in criminal cases the law doesn't require proof that overcomes every possible 
doubt. If, based on your consideration of the evidence, you're firmly convinced that the defendant 
is guilty of the crime charged, you must find him guilty. If, on the other hand, you think there's a 
real possibility that he's not guilty, you must give him the benefit of the doubt and find him not 
guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 16: During the trial, the lawyer^ asked me to determine whether 
certain evidence might be admitted. You're not to be concerned with the reasons for such requests 
or rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether evidence is admissible is purely 
a question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, I don't determine what 
weight should be given such evidence, nor do I pass on the credibility of the witness. You're not to 
consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence stricken out by me. As to any question 
to which an objection was sustained, you must not conjecture as to| what the answer might have been 
or as to the reason for the objection. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 17: As I've previously explained, 
are presented by the allegations in the Information. You should 
pity for or passion or prejudice against the defendant. The lav^ 
sentiment, sympathy, passion, prejudice, or public feeling. Both 
have a right to expect that you'll conscientiously and dispassionai 
evidence and apply the law of the case, to reach a just verdict reg; 
you're to try the issues of fact that 
pjerform this duty uninfluenced by 
forbids you to be governed by 
tfie prosecution and the defendant 
tely consider and weigh the 
ardless of the consequences. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 18: The evidence that you're to consider includes the testimony of 
witnesses, exhibits received into evidence, stipulations of the parties, reasonable inferences to be 
drawn from facts proven in the case, presumptions, if any, as stated in these instructions, and all of 
the facts and circumstances disclosed thereby. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 19: You should reconcile conflicts in the evidence as far as you 
reasonably can. But where the conflicts cannot be reconciled, you're the final judges and must 
determine from the evidence what the facts are. You should caremilly and conscientiously consider 
and compare all of the testimony and all of the facts and circumstances that have a bearing on any 
issue and determine therefrom what the facts are. You're not bound to believe witnesses unless their 
testimony is reasonable and convincing in view of all of the facts and circumstances in evidence. 
You may believe one witness as against many, or many as against a fewer number, in accordance 
with your honest convictions. If you believe a witness has willfully testified falsely as to any 
material fact in this case, you may disregard the whole of the testimony of such a witness, or you 
may give it such weight as you think it's entitled to. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 20: You're the exclusive judges 
and the weight of the evidence. In judging the weight of thel 
witnesses, you've a right to take into consideration their bias, interest 
probable motive or lack thereof to testify fairly, if any is shown 
deportment on the witness stand, the reasonableness of their statements 
candor, their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and 
should consider these matters together with all of the other facts 
believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of the witnesses 
of the credibility of the witnesses 
testimony and credibility of the 
in the result of the suit, or any 
You may consider the witnesses' 
, their apparent frankness or 
their capacity to remember. You 
and circumstances that you may 
statements. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 21: The defendant isn't required to testify. The law expressly gives 
the defendant the privilege of not testifying if he so chooses. And if the defendant hasn't taken the 
witness stand, then you must not take that fact as any indication of guilt, nor should you indulge in 
any presumption or inference adverse to the defendant by reason thereof. The burden remains with 
the prosecution, regardless of whether the defendant testifies or not, to prove the defendant's guilt 
beyond a reasonable doubt. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 22: The rules of evidence ordinarily do not permit the opinion of 
witnesses to be received as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. 
A person who by education, study, or experience has become an expert in any art, science, or 
profession, may give his/her opinion as to any matter in which the witness is qualified as an expert 
and that is material to the case. You're not bound to believe anyone's opinion. Consider it as you 
would any other evidence, and give it the weight you think it deserves. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 23: In determining any fact in this case, you shouldn't consider or 
be influenced by anything I've said or done that you may interpret as indicating my views thereon. 
You're the sole and final judges of all questions of fact submitted to you, and you must determine 
the facts for yourselves from the evidence, without regard to what you believe I think. I haven't 
intended to express any opinion on what the proof shows or doesn't show, or what are or what aren't 
the facts in the case. You must follow your own views and not be influenced by my views. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 24: If in these instructions any rule, direction, or idea has been stated 
in varying ways, no emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, 
you're not to single out any individual point or instruction, and ignore the others; rather, you're to 
consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the others. Also, the 
order in which I've given the instructions has no significance as to their relative importance. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 25: I've tried to give you instructions embodying all of the rules of 
law that may become necessary in guiding you to a just and lawful verdict. The applicability of some 
of these instructions will depend upon the conclusions that you reach as to what the facts are. As 
to any such instruction, the fact that it has been given must not be taken as indicating an opinion by 
me that the instruction will be necessary or as to what the facts are. If an instruction applies only to 
a state of facts that you find doesn't exist, disregard the instruction. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 26: Courts of justice recognize and admit two classes of evidence, 
upon either or both of which, juries lawfully may base their findings, whether favorable to the 
prosecution or to the defendant, provided, however, that to support a verdict of guilt the evidence, 
whether of one kind or the other or a combination of both, must carry the convincing quality required 
by law. One class of evidence is known as direct and the other as circumstantial. The law makes 
no distinction between the two classes as to the degree of proof required for conviction or as to their 
effectiveness in defendant's favor, but respects each for such convincing force as it may carry and 
accepts each as a reasonable method of proof. Direct evidence of a person's conduct at any time in 
question consists of the testimony of every witness who, with any of his/her own physical senses, 
perceived such conduct or any part thereof, and which testimony describes or relates what thus was 
perceived. All other evidence admitted in the trial is circumstantial in relation to such conduct, and, 
insofar as it shows any act, statement or other conduct, or any circumstance of fact, tending to prove 
by reasonable inference the innocence or guilt of the defendant, I it may be considered by you in 
arriving at a verdict. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 27: I've permitted you to take notes. Many courts don't, and a word 
of caution is in order. There's always a tendency to attach undue importance to matters that one has 
written down, but some testimony that's considered unimportant at the time presented, and thus not 
written down, takes on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the evidence presented. 
Consequently, your notes are only a tool to aid your own individual memory and you shouldn't 
compare your notes with other jurors in determining the content of any testimony or in evaluating 
the importance of any evidence. Your notes are not evidence and are by no means a complete outline 
of the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your memory should be your 
greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a decision in this case. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 28: You shouldn't consider as evidence any statement of counsel 
made during the trial unless such statement was made as a stipulation conceding the existence of a 
fact or facts. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 29: To constitute the crime chargdd 
be the joint operation of two essential elements: conduct prohibited 
culpable mental state or states with regard to the conduct prohibited by 1; 
be founcj guilty of a crime, the evidence must prove beyond a reasonable 
was prohibited from committing the conduct charged in the Information 
committed such conduct with the culpable mental state required for 
in the Information, there must 
by law and the appropriate 
aw. Before a defendant may 
doubt that the defendant 
and that the defendant 
such offense. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 30: The intent with which an act is done denotes a state of mind and 
connotes a purpose in so acting. Intent, being a state of mind, is seldom susceptible of proof by 
direct aifid positive evidence and may ordinarily be inferred fron[i acts, conduct, statements, and 
circumstances. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 31: A person engages in conduct! intentionally, or with intent, or 
willfully with respect to the nature of his conduct or to a result of his conduct when it is his 
conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct or cause me result. A person engages in 
conduct knowingly or with knowledge with respect to the nature of his conduct or to circumstances 
surrounding his conduct when he is aware of the nature of his conduct or the existing circumstances. 
A persoh acts knowingly or with knowledge with respect to a result of his conduct when he is aware 
that his conduct is reasonably certain to cause the result. A person engages in conduct recklessly 
with resbect to circumstances surrounding his conduct or the result of his conduct when he is aware 
of but consciously disregards a substantial and unjustifiable risk that the circumstances exist or the 
result will occur. The risk must be of such a nature and degree that its disregard constitutes a gross 
deviation from the standard of care that an ordinary person! would exercise under all the 
circumstances as viewed from the actor's standpoint. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 32: Intent and motive should never 
prompts a person to act, or fail to act. Intent refers only to the state 
be confused. Motive is what 
of mind with which an act is 
done or omitted. Motive is not an element of any offense, and hence need not be proven. The 
motive of an accused is immaterial except insofar as evidence of motive may aid in your 
determination of state of mind or intent. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 33: "On or about" includes any day that closely approximates or is 
near the day alleged in the Information. "Conduct" means an act or omission. "Act" means a 
voluntary bodily movement and includes speech. "Omission" means a failure to act when there is 
a legal duty to act and the actor is capable of acting. 
[INTENTIONALLY LEFT BLANK] 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3^f 
Before you can convict the defendant, Sherman A. Lynph, of the offense of Criminal 
Homicide, Murder, alleged to have occurred on or about the 3r4 day of October, 2007, in Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, as charged in count I of the information, you must find from all of 
the evidence and beyond a reasonable doubt each and every one df the following elements of that 
offense: 
JL That the defendant, Sherman A. Lynch, caused thje death of Patricia Rothermich; 
and 
2. That said defendant then and there did so: (a) intentionally or knowingly; or (b) 
intending to cause serious bodily injury to another, he committed an act clearly dangerous to 
human life, which act caused the death of Patricia Rothermich; oi* (c) acting under circumstances 
evidencing a depraved indifference to human life, he knowiqgly engaged in conduct which 
created a grave risk of death to another and which conduct caused the death of Patricia 
Rothermich; and 
3. That said defendant then and there did so unlawfully. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this case, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a (reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Criminal Homicide, Murder as charged in count I of the information. 
If, on the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonably doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty | of count I. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 35 
You are further instructed that you should consider the lesser included offense of 
manslaughter if you do not find the defendant guilty of the charged offense, criminal homicide, 
murder. 
INSTRUCTION NO . £(• 
Before you can convict the defendant of the crime of 
manslaughter, you must find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable 
doubt, all ot the following elements of that crime: 
1. Ln Salt Lake County, on or about Ojctober 3, 2007, the 
defendant, Sherman Alexander Lynch/ 
2. Caused the death of another m orle of the following 
circumstances: 
While acting recklessly. 
If you believe that the evidence establishes each and all of 
the essential elements of the offense beyond a Ireasonable doubt, it 
is your duty to convict the defendant. On th^ other hand, if the 
evidence has failed to so establish one or motfe of said elements, 
then you should find the defendant not guilty. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3 ? -
"Serious bodily injury" means bodily injury that creates or causes serious permanent 
disfigurement, protracted loss or impairment of the function of any bodily member or organ, or 
creates a substantial risk of death. 
The term "unlawful" or "unlawfully" means contrary to law or without legal justification. 
INSTRUCTION NO. 3& 
As used in these instructions, "grave risk of death" refers to probability of the risk of 
death greater than just a "substantial and unjustifiable" risk. A 'jgrave risk of death" means a 
highly likely probability that death will result from the risk that the (defendant knowingly creates. 
The term "knowingly" as used in the definition of depraved indifference murder means 
that the actor knew the nature of his conduct, knew the circumstancbes that gave rise to the risk of 
death, and knew that the risk constituted a grave risk of death, but he need not have had as his 
conscious objective or desire to cause the result; nor, need he fce aware that his conduct is 
reasonably certain to cause the results i.e., death. 
The term "depraved indifference to human life" refers n&t to the subjective culpable 
mental state of depraved indifference murder, but rather to an objective reasonable person 
standard as to the value of human life. "Depraved indifference1' means an utter callousness 
toward the value of human life and a complete and total indifferenqe as to whether one's conduct 
will create a grave risk of death to another. Thus, a finding of depraved indifference must be 
based on an objective evaluation of the magnitude of the risk created and of all the circumstances 
surrounding the death. 
INSTRUCTION NO. J ? } _ 
"Caused the death of another" means the death of the victim resulted proximately from 
some act or omission on the part of the defendant. 
The proximate cause of an injury or death is that cause, which in a natural and continuous 
sequence, and which is unbroken by an efficient intervening cause, produces the injury, and 
without which the result would not have occurred. It is the efficient cause — the one that 
necessarily sets in operation the factors that accomplish the injury. 
One who inflicts an injury on another is deemed by the law to have caused the death of 
another if the injury contributes immediately or mediately to the death of such other. 
It is not indispensable to a conviction that the wounds inflicted by the actor be fatal and 
the direct cause of death. It is sufficient that they cause death indirectly through a chain of 
natural effects and causes unchanged by human action. The fact that other causes contribute to 
the death does not relieve the actor of responsibility, provided such other causes are not the sole 
proximate cause of the death. 
INSTRUCTION NO _H° _ 
Before you can convict the defendant, Sherman A. Lynch,| of the crime of Obstruction of 
Justice, alleged to have occurred on or about the 3rd day of October through the 8th of October, 
2007, in Salt Lake County, State of Utah, as charged in count \\ of the Information, you must 
find from the evidence, beyond a reasonable doubt, all of the following elements of that crime: 
1. That, the defendant, Sherman A. Lynch, 
2. With the intent to hinder, delay, or prevent the ihvestigation, apprehension, or 
prosecution of any person regarding conduct which Iconstitutes a criminal offense: 
3. Alters, destroys, conceals, or removes any item or other thing. 
If, after careful consideration of all of the evidence in this fcase, you are convinced of the 
truth of each and every one of the foregoing elements beyond a reasonable doubt, then you must 
find the defendant guilty of Obstructing Justice as charged in couht II of the information. If, on 
the other hand, you are not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt of any one or more of the 
foregoing elements, then you must find the defendant not guilty of fcount II. 
INSTRUCTION NO. _Ji[ 
A separate crime or offense is charged in each count of the information. Each charge and 
the evidence pertaining to it should be considered separately. The fact that you may find the 
accused guilty or not guilty as to one of the offenses charged should not control your verdict as 
to any other offense charged. 
DATED THIS /f . DAY OF NOVEMBER, 2008. 
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Lynch. 
And how do we know that? I'm going to end with two 
statements, both of them by the Defendant. 
Number one, the next morning when he gives that 
interview to Channel 2 News, what does he tell Channel 2 News? 
We're looking for a truck with damage on the front driver's 
side. Every detective that testified said we never told him 
where the damage was at. The only thing he knew was that she 
had been struck while she was walking on the opposite side of 
the road, but he doesn't know where the damage is on the truck 
unless he's driving the truck and watched her head slam into 
the hood right in front of him. 
And the other thing he said was to a person he 
considered his best friend that goes to the hospital, that's 
there with him in his time of grief, and he walks up and the 
first thing he says, "Is what have I — what am I going to do 
without her? What have I done?" He killed his wife. He did 
it intentionally and then he tried to cover his tracks by 
hiding his truck in the garage. And we ask you to find him 
guilty on both counts. Thank you. 
(Whereupon the clerk swears in the bailiff.) 
THE COURT: Members of the jury, I'm now going to ask 
you to go with the bailiff to commence your deliberations. You 
may not take anything into the jury roam with you other than 
your notes, the preliminary and final instructions to you on 
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U. S. CONST. AMEND. VI 
In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the (right to a speedy and 
public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district wherein the crime shall have 
been committed, which district shall have been previously ascertained by law, and to be 
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his favor, and to have 
the assistance of counsel for his defense. 
U. S. CONST. AMEND. XIV 
Section 1. 
All persons bom or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction 
thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the state wherein they reside. No state 
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens 
of the United States; nor shall any state deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, 
without due process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
UTAH CONST. ART. I, § 7 
No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, withouti due process of 
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